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TRANSCENDENTAL DECONSTRUCTION, 
TRANSCENDENT JUSTICE 
J.M. Balkin* 
INTRODUCTION 
A meaningful encounter between two parties does not change only 
the weaker or the stronger party, but both at once. We should expect 
the same from any encounter between deconstruction and justice. It 
might be tempting for advocates of deconstruction to hope that decon-
struction would offer new insights into problems of justice, or, more 
boldly, to assert that "the question of justice" can never be the same 
after the assimilation of deconstructive insights. But, as a deconstruc-
tionist myself, I am naturally skeptical of all such blanket pronounce-
ments, even - or perhaps especially - pronouncements about the 
necessary utility and goodness of deconstructive practice. Instead, in 
true deconstructive fashion, I would rather examine how deconstruc-
tionists' claims of what they are doing - which are often refused the 
name of "theory" or "method" - are uncannily altered by their en-
counter with questions of justice. In fact, as I hope to show, when 
deconstruction focuses on specific and concrete questions of justice, we 
will discover that deconstruction has always been something quite dif-
ferent from what most people thought it to be. 
When I first began to write about deconstruction and law, I faced 
the task of translating deconstructive arguments in philosophy and 
literature to the concerns of law and justice. In the process, I pro-
posed an understanding of deconstruction that enabled it to be em-
ployed in a critical theory of law. I fully recognized then that, in 
translating the insights of deconstructionists to the study of law, I was 
also working a transformation - for to translate is to iterate, and iter-
ability alters. 1 Not surprisingly, I was subsequently accused of misun-
derstanding both Derrida and deconstruction, and of emphasizing a 
logocentric version of deconstruction that misinterpreted Derrida's 
texts and subverted and undermined "true" or "proper" deconstruc-
* Charles Tilford McCormick Professor of Law, University of Texas. - Ed. My thanks to 
Guyora Binder, David Gray Carlson, Sandy Levinson, Jay Mootz, and Tom Seung for their 
comments on previous drafts of this essay. 
1. See J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 745 & n.8, 
761 n.56 (1987) (comparing the account oflegal deconstruction to a translation or alteration of 
it, and offering it as a dangerous supplement to Derridean deconstruction). 
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tive practice.2 
There is a certain irony to this accusation - the subversion of a 
putatively "orthodox" or properly performed deconstruction by a 
closet logocentrist. Yet it must be true, mustn't it, that there is a bet-
ter and a worse way to engage in deconstructive argument? After all, 
deconstructive arguments are studied in departments of philosophy 
and comparative literature, and tests are given, and Ph.D. theses writ-
ten, and degrees awarded, on the basis of this assumption. Aren't 
these tests graded as better or worse, and aren't these theses subjected 
to examination and sent back for revisions? How could one make 
sense of what deconstructionists do if there were not a better and a 
worse way to understand and perform deconstructive arguments? 
Surely it cannot be the case that "everything goes," where the determi-
nation of what is or is not a better use or understanding of deconstruc-
tion is concerned. 
Nevertheless, I shall short-circuit this deconstructive quandary, 
which is potentially interminable. I plead guilty to the charge. If one 
is to adapt deconstruction to the critical study of law, the practice of 
deconstruction must, in fact, be altered, changed, modified, and, I 
would even say, improved. Certain features of Derrida's texts, for ex-
ample, must be emphasized and others deemphasized and regarded as 
mistaken. Only in this way can deconstructive argument be made a 
useful tool of critical analysis. Only in this way can it escape the many 
criticisms of nihilism that have been leveled at it. 
How logocentric of me. 
So, I freely confess, I am a traitor to deconstruction. Yet, as we 
know, "traitor" and "tradition" come from the same root: The tradi-
tionalist hands down, while the traitor hands over. In both cases there 
is a passing off, a changing. (Yet the ambiguities continue: one can 
pass off a baton, as in a relay race, or pass off counterfeit money or 
goods.) The traitor-traditionalist distinction, with all of its accompa-
nying uncertainties, is surely one of the most interesting for a decon-
structionist. 3 There is an important sense in which I am continuing in 
the tradition of deconstructive argument even as I am insufficiently 
deconstructive by the standards of a purportedly "pure," "orthodox," 
"properly performed" deconstruction. If every traditionalist is also, in 
2. See Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1627, 1695 (1991) 
("(T]his is not Derrida, and it is not deconstruction."); see also Pierre Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte, 
C'est Moi'~· The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1631, 1641-42 (1990). 
3. For a discussion, see J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, 
11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1613, 1619-20 (1990). 
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some sense, a traitor to what she preserves in the name of tradition -
by altering it, freezing it in time, sucking the life out of it, and substi-
tuting the dry husk of unthinking imitation - might not every traitor 
also be, in some sense yet to be determined, a traditionalist of the first 
order? 
As a traitor, however, I have an even greater satisfaction. As time 
has passed, Derrida himself has followed my perfidy. He has left the 
ranks of his apostles and joined the ranks of the apostates. His en-
counter with justice has brought him to many of the same conclusions 
about the meaning and use of deconstruction I have offered. So per-
haps I was following him all along, in following the direction in which 
he later followed me. Perhaps I agreed with him all along, in agreeing 
with that with which he would later agree. Who is the traitor, and 
who the traditionalist now? 
A key deconstructive idea is that iterability, or the capacity to be 
repeated in new contexts, results in change. Nevertheless, in examin-
ing how repetition is linked to change, we must always keep in mind 
two possible explanations, two different paths of explanation. The first 
claims that what we understand later really is different from the origi-
nal and is consequently an improvement or a falling away. The second 
claims that this repeated thing has really always been the same; the 
new context has merely altered our understanding of it, with a conse-
quent improvement or falling away of that understanding. Often it is 
very difficult to tell which claim we are making. It is often unclear 
whether we are traditionalists, who preserve the old in new guises and 
new understandings, or betrayers, who offer only an altered, imperfect 
substitute. After all, everyone is familiar with sectarian disputes be-
tween competing groups of believers - whether religious, political, or 
academic - who offer competing interpretations concerning the com-
mon object of their belief, branding their opponents as traitors while 
describing themselves as keepers of the faith. 
It is this type of perfidy (which is at the same time a form of faith-
fulness), this alteration of deconstruction (which is at the same time 
not an alteration) that I would like to discuss here. 
Of course, a deconstructionist must have texts to work with, texts 
to make her argument with. I take as my texts three writings by 
Jacques Derrida. The first is a lecture he gave in 1989 at a conference 
at the Cardozo Law School on "Deconstruction and the Possibility of 
Justice." This talk was later published under the title Force of Law: 
"The Mystical Foundation of Authority'~ 4 In this address, he an-
4. Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority," 11 CARDOZO L. 
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swered critics who accused deconstruction of nihilism or (perhaps 
worse) political quietism and complete irrelevance to questions of jus-
tice. Derrida replied that, far from failing to address the question of 
justice, deconstruction had addressed little else. 5 As evidence he listed 
a series of recent articles he had written that, in his opinion, concerned 
questions of justice. 6 
Of course, from a deconstructionist's standpoint, what might be 
most interesting about this list are the articles that Derrida did not 
choose to mention. One might think that these articles were withheld 
because they were wholly irrelevant to questions of justice. After all, 
in several of the writings that Derrida does mention, it takes quite a 
stretch to see them as directly addressing the question of justice. 7 A 
fortiori, the articles not mentioned must be even more divorced from 
these issues. Yet no deconstructionist worth her salt would accept 
such an obvious attempt at marginalization so readily; it would be like 
waving a red flag in front of a bull. Let us look, then, at the discarded, 
irrelevant parts of the Derridean corpus. Among them we find two 
substantial pieces on the controversy surrounding Paul de Man's war-
time journalism. s 
The basic story surrounding this scandal is by now well known. 9 
Paul de Man, Sterling Professor of Comparative Literature at Yale 
University, was a close friend of Jacques Derrida and one of the cen-
tral figures in the development of literary deconstruction. He died in 
1983, a beloved and respected teacher and scholar. In 1987, a young 
graduate student doing research for a thesis on de Man discovered 
articles de Man had written between 1940 and 1942 for the Belgian 
newspaper Le Soir. During the Nazi occupation of Belgium, Le Soir 
was seized by pro-German forces and used as a mouthpiece for pro-
N azi propaganda and antisemitic statements. 10 De Man wrote for Le 
Soir during that period. He was still in his early twenties. Some of his 
Rev. 919 (1990) (Mary Quaintance trans.). A slightly different version of this essay appears in 
DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 3 (Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 1992). 
5. Derrida, supra note 4, at 935. 
6. Id. at 929 (listing various writings on Levinas, Hegel, Freud, Kafka, Nelson Mandela, and 
the Declaration of Independence). 
7. See, for example, JACQUES DERRIDA, GLAS (1974), whose subject matter has never pre· 
cisely been determined. 
8. Jacques Derrida, Biodegradables: Seven Diary Fragments, 15 CRITICAL INQUIRY 812 
(1989) (Peggy Kamuf trans.) [hereinafter Derrida, Biodegradables]; Jacques Derrida, Like the 
Sound of the Sea Deep Within a Shell: Paul de Man's War. 14 CRITICAL INQUIRY 590 (1988) 
(Peggy Kamuf trans.) [hereinafter Derrida, Paul de Man's War]. 
9. For various accounts, see DAVID LEHMAN, SIGNS OF THE TIMES: DECONSTRUCTION 
AND THE FALL OF PAUL DE MAN (1991); RESPONSES: ON PAUL DE MAN'S WARTIME JOUR· 
NALISM (Werner Hamacher et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter RESPONSES]. 
10. See Werner Hamacher et al., Paul de Man, a Chronology, 1919-49 in RESPONSES, supra 
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articles were exclusively literary, while others were in various degrees 
concerned with politics. Moreover, as Derrida himself puts it, the 
"massive, immediate, and dominant effect" of de Man's political arti-
cles conformed to the "official rhetoric ... of the occupation forces." 11 
And one article in particular, The Jews in Contemporary Literature, 12 
is overtly antisemitic. 
The revelation of these writings created a furor in the academy 
over de Man's posthumous reputation, the relation of his past writings 
to his later academic work, and the possible relationship between de 
Man's wartime activities and the normative 9laims - or lack of nor-
mative claims - of deconstruction. Many silly and intemperate accu-
sations were leveled on all sides of this dispute. In the midst of this 
controversy, Derrida wrote two substantial articles. In the first, The 
Sound of the Deep Sea Within a Shell: Paul de Man's War, 13 he de-
fends his old friend - and deconstruction itself - from what he re-
gards as unjust accusation, and he tries to place de Man's life and 
works in their proper perspective. In the second, Biodegradables: Six 
Literary Fragments, 14 he responds to six critics of the previous essay. 
Here he defends not only de Man and deconstruction, but also himself, 
from what he regards as unjust treatment and unfair criticism. 
One can agree or disagree with Derrida's particular stance on these 
issues. Nevertheless, it is hard to argue that these articles do not raise, 
on every line of every page, issues of justice, responsibility, and fair 
treatment. Their major concerns are how one should judge de Man, 
deconstruction, and Derrida himself, and how various critics have 
fairly or unfairly treated them. The question of responsibility over-
hangs the entire discussion - responsibility for the Holocaust, respon-
sibility for collaboration, responsibility for one's silence about 
collaboration, responsibility in reading the work of another person, 
and responsibility in judging another's life and works. 
Posed in the often byzantine setting of academic disputes and aca-
demic reputations, these articles concern the most concrete questions 
of justice and raise the most impassioned prose from Derrida. Indeed, 
the second article borders on the polemical. They stand in marked 
contrast to the relatively abstract pronouncements on justice and re-
note 9, at xiii. Members of the Belgian public derisively referred to the captured institution as Le 
Soir vole ("The Stolen Evening"). Id. 
11. Derrida, Paul de Man's War. supra note 8, at 607 (emphasis omitted). Derrida offers the 
same formula in Derrida, Biodegradables, supra note 8, at 822, as proof that he was not under-
playing the malignancy of de Man's writings. 
12. Paul de Man, Les Juifs dans la Litterature Actue/le, LE Sorn, Mar. 4, 1941, at 1. 
13. Derrida, Paul de Man's War, supra note 8. 
14. Derrida, Biodegradables, supra note 8. 
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sponsibility Derrida offers in his Cardozo Law School address, Force 
of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority. 
Thus, it is all the more puzzling that Derrida did not think to list 
these essays in his catalogue of examples of deconstruction's encounter 
with justice. Derrida could hardly have forgotten them, for they had 
only recently been published when he gave his address at Cardozo. 
Nor could he have expected that his audience would not know about 
them, for they were published in a well-known literary journal; indeed 
the first article had attracted considerable controversy and led to a 
symposium of critiques in which the second appeared as a response. 15 
Nor can one object that these two articles do not discuss deconstruc-
tion or employ deconstructive techniques. In fact, both possess inter-
esting and sustained discussions of deconstruction and its place in the 
academy, as well as many passages explicitly offering and rejecting 
possible connections between deconstruction and justice, or between 
deconstruction on the one hand and fascism or totalitarianism on the 
other. 
Perhaps one might think that these articles are not worthy of men-
tion precisely because they are so concerned with a particular event, 
and therefore lack universalizability. Yet, as Derrida himself reminds 
us in his Cardozo address, justice is always addressed to events and 
persons in all of their singularity.16 What better way, one might think, 
to discover what Derrida really thinks about justice than to study his 
remarks concerning an issue about which he feels the most deeply, 
which gets him, as the saying goes, "where he lives"? We often wit-
ness people speaking abstractly, in high sounding phrases, about what 
is just and what is good. Yet, one might believe, we only see what they 
really think about these matters when they are faced with a concrete 
question of justice that truly affects them. So I read these three texts 
together - the abstract disposition on justice with the more concrete 
discussions of the de Man controversy. The first is sedate, the others 
brimming with anger and anguish. The relationship of deconstruction 
to justice lies somewhere in the conversation between them. 
Of course, there is a sense, too, in which even the more abstract 
Cardozo Law School address, which nowhere explicitly mentions de 
Man, is motivated by and concerns the de Man controversy. For by 
the late 1980s this scandal had raised anew accusations that decon-
struction was the easy refuge of nihilists or those without values or 
conscience, that a doctrine that found complications of meaning in all 
15. See Symposium, On Jacques Derrida's "Paul de Man's War," 15 CRITICAL INQUIRY 765 
(1989). 
16. Derrida, supra note 4, at 949. 
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texts was tailor-made for collaborationists with evil, unscrupulous op-
portunists, or simply weak-willed souls unable to commit to a just 
course of action when faced with obstacles or uncertainties. Thus, 
when Derrida rose to address the audience at the Cardozo Law School 
in the fall of 1989 - which was also the fall of the 1980s - it was all 
the more important to establish that deconstruction was not, nor had 
it ever been, nihilistic, opposed to justice, or even (God forbid) uncon-
cerned with justice, but that it was, quite the contrary, fully commit-
ted to the critique of injustice and the creation of a more just world. 
Deconstruction, Derrida hoped to convince his audience, could prop-
erly be used for beneficial purposes of social and cultural critique, and 
indeed, it was perhaps most correctly used for such purposes. 
Yet, in rising to respond to these critics, just as he had previously 
responded to the critics of de Man, Derrida offered examples of decon-
structive argument that were not wholly consistent with all of his pre-
vious deconstructive writings. They are, however, consistent with the 
practice of deconstruction that I have advocated. This is Derrida's 
perfidy, his betrayal of deconstruction. Yet it is a betrayal that I 
heartily endorse. 
In these essays, Derrida offers four different statements of the pos-
sible connection between deconstruction and justice. First, decon-
struction can call into question the boundaries that determine who is a 
proper subject of justice - that is, to whom justice is owed. Second, 
deconstruction demands "a responsibility without limits."17 Third, 
deconstruction requires one to address the Other in the language of 
the Other. Fourth, deconstruction is opposed to all intellectual forms 
of totalitarianism, and hence, by analogy, to political totalitarianism as 
well. 
Like Derrida, I am also concerned with deconstruction's possible 
relationship to justice. In this essay, I offer an extended critique of 
Derrida's views in order to make two basic points about the relation-
ship between justice and deconstruction. First, Derrida offers decon-
structive arguments that cut both ways: Although one can use 
deconstructive arguments to further what Derrida believes is just, one 
can also deconstruct in a different way to reach conclusions he would 
probably find very unjust. One can also question his careful choice of 
targets of deconstruction: One could just as easily have chosen differ-
ent targets and, by deconstructing them, reach conclusions that he 
would find abhorrent. Thus, in each case, what makes Derrida's 
deconstructive argument an argument for justice is not its use of 
17. Id. at 953. 
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deconstruction, but the selection of the particular text or concept to 
deconstruct and the way in which the particular deconstructive argu-
ment is wielded. I shall argue that Derrida's encounter with justice 
really shows that deconstructive argument is a species of rhetoric, 
which can be used for different purposes depending upon the moral 
and political commitments of the deconstructor. 
Second, and equally important, Derrida's use of deconstructive ar-
gument to critique existing arrangements as unjust presumes belief in 
an idea of justice that may be indeterminate but is not reducible to any 
conventional notion of justice. Derrida's arguments simply make no 
sense unless he is relying on a transcendental idea of justice, which 
human law only imperfectly articulates. Moreover, I shall argue, he 
admits this, albeit only tentatively and haltingly, in his more recent 
writings on deconstruction. 
Derrida's resistance to such a recognition is altogether understand-
able. A postulation of transcendent human values brings us a long 
way from the philosophical conception Derrida offered in Of Gram-
matology. 18 There he argued against the very existence of a "transcen-
dental signified" and made his famous statement that "[t]here is 
nothing outside of the text." 19 Nevertheless, I believe that a transfor-
mation of deconstruction becomes inevitable when deconstructionists 
begin to confront real questions of justice and injustice. If deconstruc-
tion can have salutary effects for the study of legal theory, there are 
equally salutary effects that law can have for deconstruction. So, I 
argue, when we try to make sense of Derrida's arguments about law 
and justice and read them charitably to avoid confusing and self-con-
tradictory interpretations, we arrive at an important variant of decon-
structive practice, which relies on the existence of human values that 
transcend any given culture. For want of a better name, I shall call 
this type of deconstruction transcendental deconstruction. It is the 
form of deconstruction I have advocated in my own work. 
A belief in transcendental values is often associated with the tradi-
tion of Platonism. However, the view I am concerned with is not the 
Platonism of the Republic. 20 It does not assert the existence of eternal 
and unchanging Ideas that exist in a Platonic Heaven. It does not 
postulate normative standards of determinate content. Rather, it is 
18. JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri c. Spivak trans., Johns Hopkins 
Univ. Press 1976) (1967). 
19. Id. at 158 (emphasis omitted). 
20. PLATO, Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 575 (Edith Hamilton & 
Huntington Cairns eds., Bollingen Foundation 1961) [hereinafter COLLECTED DIALOGUES] 
(Paul Shorey trans., 1930). 
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concerned with those indeterminate values or urges located in the 
human soul, which human beings articulate through positive morality 
and cultural conventions, and which nevertheless always escape this 
articulation. 
Surprisingly enough, the origins of this nonplatonic transcenden-
talism also lie in Plato's work. Plato came to a similar view after he 
had written the Republic, in later dialogues like the Statesman, 21 
Sophist, 22 and particularly the Laws. 23 He abandoned his earlier 
dreams of political perfection for a more democratic, skeptical vi-
sion. 24 By the time of the Laws, Plato realized that our idea of justice 
is inchoate and indeterminate. It is a mere skeleton; it must be fleshed 
out in the world of culture. For this reason, we must construct a con-
ception of justice using our human values and intuitions. T.K. Seung 
has called this approach "platonic constructivism"; he argues that it is 
a substantial modification of the more familiar Platonism we recall 
from the Republic. 25 But Seung's constructivism has a curious conse-
quence: The articulation of our values in human culture, law, and 
convention makes these concrete articulations different from the in-
choate values they articulate. It is this gap or discrepancy that decon-
structive argument seizes upon as the basis for its critique. The 
essence of what I am calling transcendental deconstruction, then, is to 
note the interval between the human capacity for judgment and evalu-
ation that inevitably and necessarily transcends the creations of cul-
ture, and the prescriptions and evaluations of that culture, which in 
tum articulate and exemplify human values like justice. It is in this 
sense that transcendental deconstruction depends, as Platonism itself 
does, on a conception of values that "go beyond" the positive norms of 
culture and convention. But these transcendent values do not come to 
us in a fully determinate form; they need culture to tum their inchoate 
sense into an articulated conception. And these transcendent values 
do not exist in an imaginary Platonic Heaven; they exist rather in the 
wellsprings of the human soul. 
The idea of values that "transcend" culture might suggest that 
when human beings evaluate they do so from a place outside culture. 
21. PLATO, Statesman, in COLLECTED DIALOGUES, supra note 20, at 1018 (J.B. Skemp 
trans., 1952). 
22. PLATO, Sophist, in COLLECTED DIALOGUES, supra note 20, at 957 (Francis M. Cornford 
trans., 1935). 
23. PLATO, Laws, in COLLECTED DIALOGUES, supra note 20, at 1225 (A.E. Taylor trans., 
1934). 
24. Here I draw on the excellent discussion in T.K. SEUNG, INTUITION AND CONSTRUC-
TION: THE FOUNDATION OF NORMATIVE THEORY 175-211 (1993). 
25. T.K. SEUNG, KANT'S PLATONIC REVOLUTION (forthcoming 1994). 
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But it is difficult to make sense of this claim, because culture helps 
constitute us as individuals. Thus, standing outside of culture would 
be like standing outside of ourselves. We can only express our values 
through their articulations in culture. How, then, is it possible to 
speak of transcendent human values when the ways we express our 
values must always be immanent in culture? How can values be both 
immanent and transcendent? 
To understand how values can be transcendent, we must recognize 
that value is properly a verb, not a noun. People do not "have" values 
as if they were objects that could be kept in their pockets. Rather, 
they possess an inexhaustible drive to evaluate - to name the beauti-
ful and the ugly, the better and the worse. This feature of human 
evaluation is poorly captured by our standard metaphors of value. 
These are metaphors of determinate measurement: Values work like 
scales or rulers, and to evaluate is to measure. These metaphors have 
two important conceptual entailments: The first is that a value pro-
vides a fixed standard of measurement; the second is that there is a 
necessary separation between the value that measures and the thing 
measured. If a value is a standard of measure, it must be determinate 
just as a ruler is of a determinate length. Moreover, it must exist sepa-
rately from the thing it measures. One cannot use a ruler to measure 
itself any more than one can use a balance to weigh itself. Hence, the 
metaphor of measurement leads us to assume that values can be tran-
scendent only if they somehow exist as determinate standards apart 
from the culture that they measure. This leads to Plato's ontology, 
and, I submit, to Plato's error. 
Instead we must consider a contrasting metaphor of value - that 
of an indeterminate urge or demand. Instead of viewing values as de-
terminate standards of measurement, we should understand them as a 
sort of insatiable and inchoate drive to evaluate. Because they are in-
choate they can never be made fully determinate; because they are in-
satiable they can never be fully satisfied. Our values are like an 
inexhaustible yearning for something that cannot clearly and fully be 
described; hence our values always demand more of us than we can 
ever satisfy, despite our best efforts. 
Thus, we have two metaphorical accounts of value: one of deter-
minate measurement, and one of indeterminate longing. Each is help-
ful in its own way, but neither can be usefully employed in all contexts 
and circumstances. To understand the phenomenon of transcendence 
we must recognize the metaphor of measurement as a metaphor, and 
exchange it for a different one. 
The metaphor of value as an insatiable urge or demand offers a 
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more plausible account of how our values are transcendent and why 
our articulations of them are imperfect. Under the metaphor of mea-
surement, our institutions fail to be just because they are imperfect 
representations of a determinate standard of justice; this standard is 
transcendent because it exists separate and apart from culture. Thus, 
virtue is a matter of copying, and the virtuous person is a good copyist. 
Under the contrasting metaphor, values are inchoate yearnings that 
we attempt to articulate through our cultural constructions. To be 
just we must construct examples of justice using the indeterminate 
urge for justice as our goad rather than as our guide. This means that 
the virtuous person is not a good copyist but a good architect. She 
attempts to satisfy her sense of justice by constructing just institutions. 
Nevertheless, she responds to an indefinite and indeterminate value. 
This has two consequences. First, there will be many different ways of 
constructing a just institution, depending upon the situation in which 
she finds herself and the resources she has available to her. Second, 
her constructed example of justice will never exhaust the insatiable 
longings of human value. Thus, human cultural creations will always 
fail to be perfectly just, but not because they are defective copies of a 
determinate standard. Their imperfection arises from the necessary 
inadequation that must exist between an indeterminate and inexhaust-
ible urge and any concrete and determinate articulation of justice. 
This relationship of inadequacy between culture and value is what we 
mean by "transcendence." The goal of transcendental deconstruction 
is to rediscover this transcendence where it has been forgotten. 
Some people have thought that deconstruction is aimless; that it 
has no goal or purpose. Others have argued that at best its goal is the 
mindless destruction and annihilation of all conceptual distinctions. 
Neither charge applies to the form of deconstructive practice I advo-
cate here. Transcendental deconstruction has a goal; its goal is not 
destruction but rectification.26 The deconstructor critiques for the 
purpose of betterment; she seeks out unjust or inappropriate concep-
tual hierarchies in order to assert a better ordering.27 Hence, her argu-
ment is always premised on the possibility of an alternative to existing 
norms that is not simply different, but also more just, even if the re-
sults of this deconstruction are imperfect and subject to further decon-
struction. Such a deconstruction assumes that it is possible to speak 
meaningfully of the more or the less just; it decidedly rejects the claim 
26. I borrow this expression from T.K. Seung. Id. 
27. For a defense of this normative approach to deconstruction, see J.M. Balkin, Understand-
ing Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 
105, 124-27 (1993). 
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that nothing is more just than anything else, or that all things are 
equally just. Rather than effacing the distinction between the just and 
unjust, it attempts to reveal the mistaken identification of justice with 
an inadequate articulation of justice in human culture and law. 
If this analysis is sound, deconstructive argument becomes some-
thing quite different from what most of its critics (and even some of its 
adherents) have imagined. Now deconstructive argument is premised 
on the assumption of transcendent yet only imperfectly realizable val-
ues of justice and truth. The practice of deconstructive argument may 
be skeptical about the perfection of any and every particular example 
of justice, but it is decidedly not nihilistic. Indeed, it is a deconstruc-
tion founded on faith - faith in human values which, although only 
articulable through culture, surpass and hence act as a perpetual ad-
monition to culture. This is the type of deconstructive practice I have 
advocated, and the one that makes the most sense when applied to law 
and political theory. 
Jacques Derrida, I shall argue, has gradually come around to a 
similar view, although he would not perhaps use the term transcenden-
tal to describe it. Yet it is an inevitable consequence of the connec-
tions he now wishes to draw between deconstruction and justice. 
Moreover, he has begun to insist that something like this is what he 
always had in mind by deconstruction.28 Is this an adequate descrip-
tion of his project or a specious substitution? Is this tradition or be-
trayal? That is for the reader to judge. 
I. DECONSTRUCTION AND THE SUBJECTS OF JUSTICE 
The first connection between justice and deconstruction that Der-
rida hopes to demonstrate concerns the definition of who is a subject 
of justice, that is, who can be treated justly or unjustly. Throughout 
Western civilization, Derrida argues, the category of subjects of justice 
has been limited.29 Deconstruction furthers justice, he insists, because 
it calls these limitations into question. 30 
Derrida argues that Western civilization has traditionally consid-
ered justice and injustice to be concepts that apply only to persons, in 
particular to persons who possess the capability of language.31 These 
are persons whom one can speak to - and hence reason with. "[O]ne 
28. Here one must be sensitive to the possibility that my assessment of Derrida applies with 
equal force to me: Repetition of older arguments in new contexts may have produced changes in 
views that I claim always to have held. 
29. Derrida, supra note 4, at 951-53. 
30. Id. at 953-55. 
31. Id. at 951. 
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would not speak of injustice or violence toward an animal, even less 
toward a vegetable or a stone."32 For example, "[a]n animal can be 
made to suffer, but we would never say, in a sense considered proper, 
that it is a wronged subject, the victim of a crime ... and this is true a 
fortiori, we think, for what we call vegetable or mineral or intermedi-
ate species like the sponge."33 Indeed, Derrida continues, throughout 
human history "[t]here have been, there still are many 'subjects' 
among mankind who are not yet recognized as subjects and who re-
ceive this animal treatment .... "34 To treat a person as an animal-
that is, one who is incapable of being addressed in language - is to 
consider that person's treatment not to be a question of justice or in-
justice. This argument reminds one of Chief Justice Taney's famous 
assertion in Dred Scott v. Sandford 35 that blacks "had no rights which 
the white man was bound to respect."36 Derrida even suggests that 
the primitive tradition of animal sacrifice confirmed and supported the 
notion of a separation between human subjects - who can speak and 
are the subjects and objects of just and unjust treatment - and "ani-
mals" who, by the logic of this opposition, are not capable of being 
treated unjustly.37 
The boundaries of justice, in other words, are determined by the 
boundaries of who is "human" as opposed to who is merely an 
"animal" - that is, one without language or, alternatively, without a 
recognized right to speak. Yet these boundaries and the justifications 
for these boundaries can be deconstructed, even to the point, as some 
animal rights activists would maintain, of calling into question the ex-
clusion of animal life from questions of justice. At this point the dis-
tinction between "human" and "animal" would no longer serve to 
distinguish subjects of justice from nonsubjects; we would have to in-
vent a new distinction. 
Thus, Derrida argues, the opposition "subject of justice" versus 
"nonsubject of justice" is unstable. Because of its instability, it may 
continually be questioned, and the criteria that separate the subjects of 
justice from those nonsubjects - earlier identified by the distinction 
between "humans" and "animals" - must continually be revised. 
Hence, Derrida wants to insist, deconstruction is relevant to justice 
because we can deconstruct the boundaries of who is considered a 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
36. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407. 
37. Derrida, supra note 4, at 951 .. 
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"person" or, more generally, a proper subject of justice. By challeng-
ing these boundaries, we can move from a world in which the concep-
tion of a subject of justice is wrongfully limited to one in which it 
receives a just expansion. 38 
In this way, Derrida insists, the use of deconstruction might not 
lead to nihilism or injustice. Instead deconstruction would form part 
of a progressive project that sought increasingly to expand political 
rights to those other than white male European human beings by 
deconstructing the boundaries of who are and are not the proper sub-
jects of justice. As he says, in a slightly different context, "[n]othing 
seems to me less outdated than the classical emancipatory ideal."39 
These egalitarian sentiments are surely to be applauded. Yet Der-
rida has not shown a necessary connection between deconstruction 
and justice. He has merely pointed out that one might deconstruct 
certain oppositions in a way that produces increasingly egalitarian 
conclusions. He has not shown that these are the only oppositions one 
might deconstruct. Nor has he shown that one can only deconstruct 
these oppositions in a way that produces increasingly egalitarian 
results. 
Derrida might have chosen to deconstruct or problematize the dis-
tinction between justice and injustice, between liberty and slavery, or 
between tolerance and bigotry. He does not do so. But nothing in 
deconstructive theory - if such a thing exists - directs him or for-
bids him from doing so. Deconstructive argument does not cease to 
operate when the conclusions one might draw from it are inegalitarian, 
although it is hardly surprising that Jacques Derrida sees egalitarian 
consequences flowing from his use of deconstruction. Indeed, this pos-
sibility is admitted by his very claim that deconstruction "does not 
necessarily lead to injustice ... but may ... lead to a reinterpretation" 
that is more just.40 Derrida, like every good deconstructor, picks his 
targets carefully. 
Moreover, even given the targets of his deconstruction - the his-
torically enforced oppositions between the subjects and nonsubjects of 
justice - Derrida has not shown that the only way in which these 
38. As Derrida puts it: 
[A] deconstructionist approach to the boundaries that institute the human subject (prefera-
bly and paradigmatically the adult male, rather than the woman, child or animal) as the 
measure of the just and the unjust, does not necessarily lead to injustice, nor to the efface-
ment of an opposition between just and unjust but may, in the name of a demand more 
insatiable than justice, lead to a reinterpretation of the whole apparatus of boundaries within 
which a history and a culture have been able to confine their criteriology. 
Id. at 953. 
39. Id. at 971. 
40. Cf. id. at 953 (emphasis added). 
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oppositions might be deconstructed leads to increasingly just results. 
If deconstruction calls into question the boundaries of subjects of jus-
tice, it does not follow that the only way to question these boundaries 
is to advocate their expansion. They may well be unstable, as Derrida 
insists. Yet their instability might be evidence that they are about to 
implode, rather than expand. Furthermore, even if"there must be an 
expansion, one can expand the boundary in two opposite directions -
by expanding the scope of what is assigned to the "human," who is a 
subject of justice, or by expanding the scope of what is assigned to the 
"nonhuman," which is not a proper subject of justice. In this way, the 
instability of these boundaries might well be used, as it has in the past, 
to show that blacks, or Asians, or women are not fully human beings, 
or that the distinction between women and animals, for example, is so 
unstable that it cannot fully be maintained. 
Indeed, one can understand the history of bigotry as the continu-
ous deconstruction of an imagined unity of humankind. It is the per-
petual claim that the unity of humankind is a pious fiction, a papered-
over discontinuity and heterogeneity, and that the Other within this 
imagined unity must be located and understood in all of its difference 
and inferiority. The egalitarian claims to rediscover the true similarity 
of the subjects of justice by reclaiming those who were wrongly 
grouped with nonsubjects; the bigot claims to rediscover the true simi-
larity of nonsubjects of justice by rejecting those who were wrongly 
grouped with the subjects of justice. Both deconstruct boundaries and 
categories, and the act of deconstruction does not decide between 
them. 
One might also use deconstruction to show that the boundaries of 
who may possess certain civil and political rights are unstable. Thus, 
early American feminists argued that the expansion of political rights 
to black males required the expansion of political rights to women. 
However, a similar criticism applies here. The claim that the current 
limitations of political rights - like the franchise or the right to life -
are unstable and that the justifications for these boundaries are self-
deconstructing may argue in favor of further restricting the scope of 
these rights rather than expanding them. If the extension of antidis-
crimination laws to disabled persons cannot be squared with the denial 
of such rights to homosexuals, then perhaps this result counsels in the 
direction of shrinking the rights of the disabled rather than expanding 
the rights of homosexuals. The strongly egalitarian bias of the acad-
emy makes this an unthinkable position, but it is not made unthink-
able by any feature of "deconstructive theory." It is made unthinkable 
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by the preexisting moral commitments of those who make the decon-
structive argument. 
If one begins with an egalitarian ideology, one can easily be misled 
into thinking that the "emancipatory ideal" that Derrida endorses is 
the same as deconstruction. But this assumption is based on an im-
plicit opposition or conceptual homology - namely, that deconstruc-
tion is to logocentrism as emancipation is to slavery, or as expansion of 
the subjects of justice is to contraction of the subjects of justice. Of 
course, one of the most important deconstructive techniques is the 
demonstration that the homology "A is to B as C is to D" is reversible; 
one deconstructs ideologies by subverting the conceptual homologies 
upon which they rest. My point is that this technique can be per-
formed as easily with the present set of conceptual oppositions as with 
the opposition between speech and writing in Of Grammatology. 
Furthermore, even if one accepted that deconstruction necessarily 
led to an increased domain of subjects of justice, Derrida's argument 
rests on the additional assumption that increasing the number of sub-
jects of justice increases justice. But it does not. The second half of 
the nineteenth century saw two great expansions of the domain of sub-
jects of justice in the United States. The first was the emancipation of 
the slaves and the bestowal of civil and political rights upon them 
through the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. The 
second came twenty years later in Santa Clara County v. Southern 
Pacific Railroad, 41 in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that corpo-
rations were persons for purposes of the civil and political rights guar-
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In Derrida's terms, 
corporations too became subjects of justice, and indeed, through the 
same constitutional amendment that granted civil rights to blacks. 
The result of this decision was that corporations had contract and 
property rights against other individuals that the courts were constitu-
tionally bound to enforce, and they did so with a vengeance during 
America's Gilded Age, with results that today make most economic 
egalitarians shudder.42 The legacy of Santa Clara continues to this 
41. 116 U.S. 394 (1886). 
42. I want to emphasize here that the granting of "personhood" and even "citizenship" to 
corporations was originally designed to protect the property interests of individuals who owned 
shares in a corporation. To this extent, the expansion of corporate rights seems a perfectly justifi· 
able protection of individual property rights - assuming always that the theorist in question 
believes that the basic structure of economic rights is justified. It therefore furthers, rather than 
detracts from, the "emancipatory ideal." However, one might protect these individual property 
rights in ways other than by creating a new legal subject with constitutional rights. The egalita-
rian critique, as I understand it, is that the choice of this strategy has had unexpected conse-
quences that cannot all be explained as necessary to protect the (just) rights of shareholders. To 
some degree the fiction of the corporation as a person has taken on a life of its own and has been 
used to work injustices and denials of individual rights. See, e.g., Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. 
March 1994] Transcendental Deconstruction 1147 
day: The Supreme Court has held that corporations as constitutional 
"persons" have First Amendment speech rights like those of private 
citizens. 43 This holding seems unexceptional but for the fact that cor-
porations usually have considerably more money and therefore can 
exercise their speech rights more effectively than the average citizen, 
through donations to political campaigns, purchase of time and space 
on broadcast and print media, and so on. The recognition and protec-
tion of corporate civil and political rights has enabled corporations to 
convert huge concentrations of property rights into concentrations of 
political power and thereby exercise considerable control over the 
American political process. Not surprisingly, some scholars on the 
left find these results to be perverse and to represent a net loss of indi-
vidual liberty.44 
In recent times, one of the most pressing questions before the 
American public has been the scope of the right to abortion. 
Antiabortion activists have been on the forefront of expanding the 
boundaries of personhood. One might almost believe that they were 
taking their cue from Derrida, for their arguments are nothing if not 
deconstructive: Effacing the distinction between fetus and child, they 
have argued that fetuses are "babies" and doctors who perform abor-
tions are "baby killers." Insisting on the undecideability of any 
boundaries (such as viability) between the person and the nonperson, 
they have characterized the current law of the United States as the 
most violent act of mass murder since the Holocaust. If, as Derrida 
points out, justice and injustice have been reserved in Western culture 
to the possessors of language, and if this reservation is itself in need of 
destabilizing and deconstructing - in the case of animals, for example 
- the contemporary antiabortion advocate can hardly be faulted for 
seeing in this claim an argument for the protection of defenseless fe-
tuses, who lack the power of speech and are routinely slaughtered by 
v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 87-90 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that Santa Clara should be 
overruled); c. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 220-21 (1991). For 
an examination of some of the alternative ways the issue might have been conceptualized and the 
consequences of the Santa Clara decision, see Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The 
Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173 (1985). 
43. See First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (striking down limitations on corpo-
rate spending designed to influence voters). 
44. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Corporations and Free Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LA w 253 
(David Kairys ed., 1982); cf. Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 787-91 
(1987) (describing the media's control of public debate and business's control of the political 
process). Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has itself been somewhat equivocal on the question of 
whether the scope of this First Amendment right should be equal in all respects to the right 
enjoyed by natural persons. See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 
(1990). The question for Derrida, of course, is whether further deconstruction of the boundary 
that excludes corporations from full membership as "subjects of justice" would be a good thing 
or a bad thing. 
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those who possess this power. Everything that Derrida says about the 
exclusion of animals from the domain of justice, they might argue, 
could be said on behalf of the human fetus: If a cat or a chimpanzee 
should be protected from torture or vivisection, how much more so 
should the human fetus who likewise lacks the power of speech, and 
who likewise is slaughtered for the benefit of those whom the state has 
already recognized as subjects of justice - women? 
Needless to say, many women's groups and commentators on the 
left (including, one assumes - although one does not know this for 
certain - Derrida himself) would find such an argument abhorrent. 
But is the argument abhorrent because it is not deconstructive or 
rather because it is deconstructive - because nothing in "deconstruc-
tion" prevents such an argument? Is the reason that a feminist who 
employs deconstruction would not make such an argument because 
deconstruction forbids it or because it conflicts with her deeply held 
moral and political commitments - her sense of the just and the un-
just? In other words, isn't she really using deconstructive argument to 
make sense of her existing commitments, to articulate her values? 
In the examples of corporate speech, or the pros and cons of abor-
tion, we witness what I call "ideological drift" at work. 45 An argu-
ment or principle that appears on its face to have determinate political 
consequences turns out to bear a very different political valence when 
it is inserted into new and unexpected contexts. Yet because, as 
deconstruction itself reminds us, one cannot fully control the contexts 
into which an argument or a claim can be inserted, one cannot fully 
control its political valence in future situations. The notion of ideolog-
ical drift follows from the basic deconstructive point that iterability 
alters. We have merely applied this point to the practice of decon-
structive argument itself. If the practices of deconstruction by human 
beings are themselves subject to the insights of deconstruction, this 
alteration seems inevitably to follow. The practice of deconstruction 
by human beings must also be subject to ideological drift. So is Der-
rida then hoisted on his own petard? If what is called "deconstruc-
tion" is a rhetorical practice, a series of arguments, a set of approaches 
that can be taught, repeated, iterated, used again and again in different 
contexts, places, and times, all this would seem to follow. Deconstruc-
tion, or more correctly deconstructive arguments made by human be-
ings, must be iterable in ways that lead to both just and unjust results. 
45. See J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV. 869 
(1993). 
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What, then, of this "if"? We are not prepared to answer this ques-
tion. At least not yet. 
II. A REsPONSIBILITY WITHOUT LIMITS 
A. The Infinite and the Indefinite 
Let us continue. Derrida posits a second possible relation between 
deconstruction and justice - it is "[t]he sense of a responsibility with-
out limits."46 This responsibility is "necessarily excessive, incalcula-
ble, before memory."47 Deconstruction leads to justice because it 
reveals the limitlessness of our responsibility. 
Nevertheless, a responsibility without limits is not the same thing 
as justice. We do not necessarily increase justice by increasing respon-
sibility. Suppose a plaintiff is injured in a traffic accident. The plaintiff 
picks a name at random from the phone directory and sues this person 
as a defendant. We do not necessarily increase justice by holding this 
person liable for the accident. Justice is increased by eliminating her 
responsibility. 
Nor do we necessarily increase justice by increasing the responsi-
bility of all persons. Suppose that a defendant strikes a plaintiff be-
cause the plaintiff is homosexual and the defendant hates 
homosexuals. We can justly hold the defendant responsible for this 
brutality. Suppose, however, that the defendant argues as follows: 
His parents are also responsible because they abused him as a child. 
The bystanders on the street are responsible because they did not in-
tervene on the plaintiff's behalf. The police are responsible because 
they did not prevent the injury from occurring. The state's mental 
health agencies are responsible because they did not offer the defend-
ant free counseling to deal with his aggression and his hatred of homo-
sexuals, and so on. 
The difficulty is that to increase the responsibility of one person is 
often to decrease the responsibility of another. Here the defendant 
attempts to decrease his responsibility by shifting it to third parties. 
There is no problem in increasing the responsibility of all persons as 
long as we insist that the defendant also remains fully responsible. In-
deed, this may be a more adequate description of the situation. The 
difficulty arises anew, however, when we determine the appropriate 
remedy for an injustice. How are we to divide up the responsibility 
when the plaintiff demands compensation? The more persons who are 
held responsible, the less each will have to pay, all other things being 
46. Derrida, supra note 4, at 953. 
47. Id. 
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equal. We might try to avoid this dilemma by allowing the plaintiff 
full recovery from each person held responsible, but surely this solu-
tion creates its own form of injustice.48 
The demand for an increase of justice is not necessarily the de-
mand for increased responsibility. It is rather the demand for an ap-
propriate apportionment of responsibility. That is what '~ust" means 
- neither too much nor too little, but just the right amount of respon-
sibility for each person. The very notion of apportionment implies the 
possibility that the responsibility of some persons will be decreased, if 
not eliminated. Justice involves the recognition that people are simply 
not responsible for some of the things for which others would like to 
hold them responsible. Furthermore, the demand for an appropriate 
apportionment of responsibility presupposes that there is a notion of 
appropriateness - that not every assertion of responsibility is as valid 
as any other. If the deconstructive argument is to make sense, it must 
assume that one's responsibility goes as far as it should, but no further, 
whether or not this can be known for certain. 
In this light, Derrida's essays on Paul de Man offer a useful coun-
terweight to his more abstract formulation. In these essays, Derrida 
does not assert that either he, or de Man, have limitless responsibility. 
Rather, he attempts to put de Man's responsibility in its proper per-
spective. He attempts to offer a just apportionment of responsibility, 
blame, and innocence regarding de Man, himself, and his critics. 
First, Derrida argues, de Man is not responsible for all of the many 
evils of Nazism or for the Holocaust. To compare him to Mengele, as 
one writer did, is unjust.49 Second, it is unjust to read de Man's later 
writings as an admission of guilt or responsibility - or as an attempt 
to deny responsibility - for what he did during World War 11.50 
Third, although de Man wrote a series of articles expressing the ideol-
ogy of the occupation forces and one article which is blatantly an-
tisemitic, it is unjust to judge his whole life based on that one episode 
in his youth.51 Fourth - and this is the most controversial point in 
his argument - Derrida suggests that de Man's articles are not as 
48. Increasing responsibility, moreover, always comes at a cost. The more things for which 
people are held responsible, the less time and money they have for their own pursuits. Responsi· 
bility to others comes at the price of one's freedom of action as well as one's security. An infinite 
protection of security for all will result in an infinite responsibility for all, which will paradoxi· 
cally abolish the liberty of all, and with it the security of all. The demand for infinite responsibil· 
ity is like the paradoxical predicament of the pantheist who finds she must remain motionless 
because she fears that any movement on her part will inadvertently destroy a bug or a microorga· 
nism. Whatever she does, she is responsible. Yet her failure to act makes her doubly responsible. 
49. See Derrida, Biodegradab/es, supra note 8, at 821. 
SO. Derrida, Paul de Man's War, supra note 8, at 640-51. 
51. Id. at 650-51. 
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damning as one might be led to expect when they are read in the ap-
propriate context. According to Derrida, the explicit antisemitism of 
the worst article is equivocal, and it is hardly as bad as many other 
articles in Le Soir. 52 
In the same way, Derrida responds to the critics who attacked his 
discussion of de Man by arguing that his responsibility and that of the 
institution they call "Deconstruction" is less than they imply or con-
tend. They are unjust to Derrida, a Jew who was a teenager during 
the Second World War: "I ... who have nothing whatever to do with 
everything that happened; I who, at the time, was rather on the side of 
the victims."53 They are unjust as well to the practitioners of decon-
struction, "which at the time was at year minus twenty-five of its 
calendar!"54 
These remarks suggest that Derrida cannot mean by "a responsi-
bility without limits" a limitless responsibility. Otherwise, he, de 
Man, and indeed all of us are responsible without limits for the Holo-
caust and many other horrible crimes, both past and present. But this 
would not be just: The demand of justice is often the demand that we 
are not responsible, even though we have been unjustly accused. 
Instead, we must offer an alternative account of "a responsibility 
without limits" that saves it from these difficulties. This account inevi-
tably leads us to the transcendental conception of deconstruction. A 
limitless responsibility could be an infinite responsibility, or it could be 
a responsibility whose full contours cannot be defined in advance. 
This is the distinction between the infinite and the indefinite. We can 
say, both in the case of the infinite and the indefinite, that one cannot 
draw determinate and clear boundaries, so that in both cases we are, in 
a sense, "without limits." The meaning of "without limits," however, 
is different in each case. The infinite cannot be bounded because it is 
infinite. The indefinite has no clear boundaries because its scope is so 
heavily dependent on context, and not all possible future contexts can 
be prescribed in advance. The indefinite has boundaries, but we do not 
know precisely where they are. The infinite has no boundaries, and we 
know this for certain. 
Thus, the indefinite is unlimited, but not in the way that the infi-
nite is. It makes perfect sense to say that an individual's responsibility 
is "without limits" because it is always indefinite - that is, because 
52. Id. at 621-32. In fact, Derrida asserts that, because de Man specifically distances himself 
from so-called "vulgar" antisemitism, one can even read his article as implicitly rebuking the 
more virulent examples of antisemitism in the pages of Le Soir. Id. at 625-26. 
53. Derrida, Biodegradables, supra note 8, at 820. 
54. Id. 
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the full contours of this responsibility can never be completely articu-
lated - but it is nevertheless limited in another sense because it is not 
infinite. Paul de Man's responsibility for his wartime journalism is 
without limits because its scope cannot be fully demarcated: His ac-
tions will have had effects on individuals that he could not have fore-
seen. Moreover, his actions will continue to have effects about which 
modern day judges of his responsibility do not and cannot know. In 
this sense, Paul de Man indeed has a responsibility without limits. But 
it is not an infinite responsibility. He is not responsible for the Holo-
caust, or the Lockerbie plane bombing, or the French Revolution. 
We can also apply the distinction between the infinite and the in-
definite to the meanings of texts. People often associate deconstruc-
tion with the claim that the meaning of texts is indeterminate. Yet 
there are two ways to claim that meaning is indeterminate: One can 
say that a text's meaning is infinite - that is, that it means everything 
- or one can say that its meaning is indefinite. If the meaning of 
every text is infinite, then all texts mean the same thing, because all 
texts have every meaning. But if one says that the meaning of every 
text is indefinite, we mean that the contexts in which the text will take 
its meaning cannot be specified in advance, and therefore the text will 
always have an excess of meaning over that which we expect (or in-
tend) it to have when it is let loose upon the world. The first view of 
texts is consistent with a nihilistic account of deconstruction; the sec-
ond is consistent with the type of deconstruction I advocate. 
The choice between these two approaches also corresponds to two 
different explanations of how one deconstructs a conceptual opposi-
tion. The strategy of the nihilistic view is one of total effacement - all 
conceptual distinctions are imaginary because the meanings of each 
side of the opposition are infinite. Therefore both sides mean the same 
thing. The strategy of transcendental deconstruction is one of nested 
opposition. A nested opposition is an opposition in which the two sides 
"contain" each other - that is, they possess a ground of commonality 
as well as difference. 55 In this case, the deconstruction argues that the 
two sides are alike in some contexts and different in others; the 
logocentric mistake has been to assert categorically that they were 
simply identical or simply different. Because the two sides form a 
nested opposition, their similarity and their difference rely on context, 
but because context cannot be fully determined in advance, the scope 
of their similarity and difference is indefinite. In this way the tran-
scendental conception of deconstruction preserves the possibility of 
SS. For a fuller discussion, see J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669 (1990) 
(book review). 
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conceptual distinctions, while the nihilistic version does not. 56 
The distinction between transcendental deconstruction and its un-
workable alternative rests upon the distinction between the indefinite 
and the infinite. However, since one can deconstruct any distinction, 
one should also be able to deconstruct the distinction between the in-
definite and the infinite. Even here, however, we need to ask what 
conception of deconstruction we should use to critique the theory -
the transcendental or the nihilistic. If we use a nihilistic conception, 
we would be effacing this distinction. We would say that there is no 
difference between the indefinite and the infinite in any circumstance 
or situation. So, for example, we would be saying that everything with 
indefinite boundaries is infinite in extension. It would follow that each 
day is infinite in length because the boundary between day and night is 
indefinite. Thus, the use of nihilistic deconstruction leads to an unten-
able position, just as it leads to the destruction of many other useful 
distinctions. But this is a reason to think that the nihilistic conception 
of deconstruction is seriously flawed. 
Instead, we might deconstruct the distinction between the indefi-
nite and the infinite using the technique of transcendental deconstruc-
tion. To deconstruct a conceptual opposition is to show that the 
conceptual opposition is a nested opposition - in other words, that 
the two concepts bear relations of mutual dependence as well as mu-
tual differentiation. 57 For example, we might discover that they have 
elements in common, which become salient in some contexts, but that 
in other contexts we note very important differences between them, so 
that they are not the same in all respects. In fact, we would note that 
the meaning of each depends in part on our ability to distinguish it 
from the other in some contexts. 
Thus, transcendental deconstruction, which relies on the indefi-
56. Note that even when deconstructive arguments are employed to efface a particular dis-
tinction, they do not necessarily efface the distinction in all contexts. Thus they should be distin-
guished from a strategy of total effacement. Take for example the distinction between writing 
and speech discussed in DERRIDA, supra note 18. Derrida argues that speech and writing are 
special cases of a more general form of "writing." He claims that people often assume that 
speech is closer to truth or true meaning than writing, but this assumption is not necessarily 
justified. Both possess the same features of signification, which are simply more obvious in the 
case of writing. Derrida's argument uses deconstruction for purposes of rectification; it argues 
that this new conception is a better - that is, truer - way of viewing things than the received 
wisdom. It is not a strategy of total effacement because his argument does not in fact efface the 
distinction between writing and speech in all contexts; it does so only with respect to the issue of 
semiotic function. Writing is still written, and speech is still spoken; hence even after the decon-
struction we cannot say that writing and speech are identical in all contexts of judgment. This is 
a deconstructive argument of rectification; it shows not that speech and writing are identical, but 
that there is a nested opposition between the two concepts. See Balkin, supra note 55, at 1689-
93. 
57. Id. at 1676. 
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niteness rather than the effacement of all conceptual boundaries, 
would insist that although we can offer relatively clear examples of 
bounded but indefinite concepts - for example, between day and 
night - we cannot demarcate in advance every example of the indefi-
nite from every example of the infinite. Some of the things that we 
currently think are indefinite may tum out, in a different context of 
judgment, to be infinite and vice versa. We cannot know for sure be-
cause this distinction, like all others, is context dependent. Neverthe-
less, the very fact that this distinction is so heavily dependent upon 
context means that we cannot say that the distinction is meaningless, 
or that the terms collapse into each other. ss 
B. Deconstruction and Reconstruction 
We have seen that, if Derrida's arguments about responsibility are 
to make sense, he must be cominitted to a transcendental conception 
of deconstruction, whether or not he specifically recognizes this fact. 
Moreover, the concept of an indefinite, rather than an infinite, respon-
sibility better corresponds to the very important relationship of mutual 
differentiation and dependence that must always exist between law and 
justice. Laws apportion the comparative responsibility of parties. But 
laws can never perform this apportionment perfectly. They can never 
determine and assign completely the full responsibility of each and 
every person, living or dead, in exactly the right amount. First, laws 
must limit their concern to certain features of a situation and to cer-
tain effects that have already happened (or that can be proved in a 
court of law to have happened). Second, laws can extend their reach 
only to some parties, but not to all who might, in some larger sense, be 
responsible - for example, those who escape judgment because they 
are dead, out of the relevant jurisdiction, or bankrupt. Third, laws 
must speak in general terms that must be applied to many different 
58. I have argue(! that transcendental deconstruction is premised on the assumption of tran· 
scendent values, and that this assumption inevitably leads to a logic of indefinite rather than 
infinite meanings. We might be tempted to identify transcendent values with the infinite rather 
than the indefinite because people sometimes think of the transcendent as that which surpasses 
all others. However, the question of transcendent values really concerns the relationship between 
general normative concepts like justice or beauty and their particular instantiations in the real 
world. Our notion of justice is transcendent because no particular example of justice in the world 
is perfectly just; it is indefinite because it cannot be reduced to any determinate formula. These 
are two ways of describing the same phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, our idea of justice is not infinite; it does not lack boundaries, even if these are 
not fully determined. For example, the value of justice is not the same thing as the value of 
beauty. If general normative concepts really had no limits, they would all be identical because 
there would be no way to distinguish them from each other. So, although our transcendent 
notion of justice is not specific enough to match any determinate example of justice or any deter· 
minate formula of justice, it is specific enough to be distinguished from other normative concepts. 
That is why it is indefinite but not infinite. 
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factual contexts and therefore at best can fit each of these contexts like 
a mass-produced suit fits a body - perhaps well enough in some cir-
cumstances to be presentable, but certainly not perfect in all respects. 
Because responsibility is so deeply tied to context - both the contexts 
which have already emerged and those which in the fullness of time 
will emerge - human law must always, even in its best moments, be 
merely a heuristic, a catch-as-catch-can solution to the problem of re-
sponsibility rather than a fully adequate solution. Thus, to speak of 
the indefiniteness of human responsibility, and to speak of its failure to 
be fully measured, apportioned, and captured by human laws and 
human conventions, are really two ways of saying the same thing. 
At the same time, our notion of justice can only be articulated and 
enforced through human laws and conventions. We may have an idea 
of justice that always escapes law and convention, but the only tools 
we have to express and enforce our idea are human laws and human 
conventions. In this sense our conception of the just relies for its artic-
ulation and enforcement on the imperfect law from which it must al-
ways be distinguished. 
In sum, law is never perfectly just, but justice needs law to be ar-
ticulated and enforced. This argument is exemplary of a transcenden-
tal approach to deconstruction, the only approach that can rescue 
deconstruction from the nihilistic abyss of infinite meaning. It as-
sumes that human values like justice transcend the positive norms of 
human culture, even as they depend upon these norms for their articu-
lation and expression. Human values like justice are always indeter-
minate; they must be constructed and articulated through culture, law, 
and convention. Yet any articulation of human value never fully ex-
hausts the scope of human evaluation. We may offer a theory of what 
is just, and this theory may assist our judgments of what is just, but it 
does not ever fully displace our sense of justice. We always retain the 
ability to understand that our conventions, laws, and theories of jus-
tice fall short of our value of justice. Thus, our indeterminate values 
continue to demand more from us than our articulations of them can 
ever give; our urge to evaluate serves as a perpetual reminder of the 
gap between our values and their articulations in law or convention. 
Equally important, my argument assumes that it makes sense to 
speak of the more just and the less just in a given context, even though 
our sense of justice is always indeterminate and indefinite. It denies 
that every conceptual articulation of justice is as good as any other, or 
that every solution to the problem of justice is as good as any other. If 
I claim that a human law only imperfectly captures the responsibility 
of individuals, I must assume that there is another accounting of re-
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sponsibility that would be more just, even if I cannot describe a per-
fectly just solution. If I do not assume this, then my argument has no 
critical import. If there is no more just solution, then either the solu-
tion which I criticize is the best possible solution - in which case I 
have no reason to criticize it - or this solution is as good as any other 
solution I might offer as an alternative - in which case there is no 
reason to choose between them. 
Thus, the transcendental conception of deconstruction is premised 
on the possibility of an alternative reconstruction that is superior to the 
given target of deconstruction. In this sense, deconstruction always 
depends on reconstruction, even though this reconstruction may be 
subject to further deconstructive critique. At the same time, theoreti-
cal (re)construction always depends on the tools of deconstruction. If 
we wish to construct a just account of moral or legal responsibility, we 
must be able to choose between competing alternatives and discard 
those that prove unsatisfactory. However, to critique the various pos-
sibilities, and discover their hidden incoherences, we need the critical 
tools of deconstruction. 59 
A deconstructionist, Derrida included, can hardly avoid this anal-
ysis. Does he accept it? In his later writings, he seems to move to-
ward it. Deconstruction, he argues, demands that we "constantly ... 
maintain an interrogation of the origin, grounds and limits of our con-
ceptual . . . apparatus surrounding justice. " 60 This demand does not 
"neutraliz[e an] interest in justice" but "[o]n the contrary ... hyper-
bolically raises the stakes of exacting justice."61 Deconstruction re-
quires a "sensitivity to a sort of essential disproportion" between 
existing law or custom and justice. 62 The deconstructive attitude 
"strives to denounce not only theoretical limits but also concrete injus-
tices, with the most palpable effects, in the good conscience that dog-
matically stops before any inherited determination of justice. "63 
Hence, Derrida connects the notion of limitless responsibility with 
deconstruction's "engage[ment]" by an "infinite demand ... for 
justice. " 64 
Yet the claim of an essential disproportion between law and justice 
simply restates the point that there is an idea or value of justice that 
59. For a fuller discussion of the relationship between deconstruction and reconstruction, see 
Balkin, supra note 27, at 124-27. 
60. Derrida, supra note 4, at 955. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
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transcends any specific example of justice, whether embodied in law, 
custom, or convention. Indeed, as Derrida later notes, "the decon-
struction of all presumption of a determinant certitude of a present 
justice itself operates on the basis of an infinite 'idea of justice.' " 65 
This is perhaps the closest Derrida comes to the transcendental con-
ception. He hesitates at this point because he does not wish "to assim-
ilate too quickly this 'idea of justice' to a regulative idea (in the 
Kantian sense), to a messianic promise or to other horizons of the 
same type. "66 Nevertheless, Derrida's hesitation is unnecessary, for 
the deconstructive approach I advocate is not based on a fixed and 
determinate Idea of justice, but an indeterminate and indefinite human 
value. This value is the very sort of "demand" that Derrida identifies 
with justice: an insatiable urge that is never fully realized in the prod-
ucts of human law, culture, and convention. 
III. SPEAKING IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE OTHER 
Derrida's third formulation of the relation between deconstruction 
and justice notes the etymological connections between justice and an-
swering. To be just is to have responsibility, which is to respond to or 
to answer for something. Thus, Derrida speaks of justice as an "infi-
nite demand.''67 However, not any answer will do. Justice, Derrida 
insists, requires one to address oneself to the Other in the language of 
the Other: It requires us to forswear our own way of thinking, talking, 
and looking at things in order to understand the Other in all of her 
singularity and uniqueness. 68 This requirement is ultimately impossi-
ble to attain, and hence the infinite demand of justice can never fully 
be satisfied. 
Because justice demands that we address ourselves in the language 
of the Other, the law can never be fully just. The problem for law, 
Derrida argues, is threefold. First, law must speak in general terms, 
and therefore it must simplify and falsify the situation at hand. 69 
Legal understanding never allows us to understand situations or the 
65. Id. at 965. 
66. Id. By a "regulative idea," Kant meant an idea that we must postulate or employ as a 
heuristic, in order to assist our use of reason. The self, the world, and God are examples of 
regulative ideas. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 549-60 (Norman K. 
Smith trans., London, MacMillan 1929) (1781). 
67. Derrida, supra note 4, at 955. In discussing Derrida's arguments concerning justice I 
shall follow his practice of speaking about the "demand" of justice, or about what justice "de-
mands," to describe what is just or unjust. Nevertheless, I should note at the outset that this 
familiar locution has the twin rhetorical effects of anthropomorphizing justice and downplaying 
human subjectivity, as I describe more fully below. See infra text accompanying notes 136-37. 
68. See Derrida, supra note 4, at 949. 
69. See id. 
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persons affected in all of their uniqueness. We must understand them 
instead filtered through a set of legal categories, or classes of situa-
tions, that lump them together with many other equally heterogenous 
and unique circumstances. The enforcement of the law according to 
these categories is a form of simplification and falsification, and this 
simplification and falsification are sources of injustice.70 
Second, as James Boyd White has recently noted, the problem of 
justice is inherently a problem of translation. 71 For judges or other 
parties to speak in the language of another, they must translate the 
Other's language into their own. But translations are always imper-
fect. They never fully convey the sense of the original. Hence the very 
necessity of translation renders it impossible fully to speak in the lan-
guage of the Other. 72 
Third, the requirement that law be impartial demands that we not 
speak in the language of a particular party, but in a language that is 
neutral and fair. 73 To speak in the language of only one of the parties 
risks the danger of undue partiality toward that person, for the situa-
tion will be completely described in terms of her experience and her 
concerns. This result is unfair because it may give short shrift to the 
experience and concerns of other parties. Hence, law, which requires 
fairness to all parties, must proceed in the language of neither one 
party nor the other, but in a third language that attempts - even if it 
does not always succeed - to be fair to both sides. Legal justice 
strives for an impartiality that is also impersonal. Yet this solution 
creates its own set of problems, for the neutral language of a third 
party fails to speak in the language of either party, and hence it doubly 
falsifies the situation by denying or obscuring the uniqueness and sin-
gularity of each side. 74 
Derrida's ethics of Otherness contains two separate imperatives. 
The first demands that we see a situation in all of its singularity. The 
second demands that we attempt to see things from the Other's point 
of view, using her vocabulary and her way of understanding the world. 
To deal justly with each of these two points, we must not conflate 
them, but rather deal with each separately - that is, respecting the 
singularity and difference of each. 
70. See id. 
71. See JAMES B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 257-69 (1990). 
72. See Derrida, supra note 4, at 949. This idea is related to a theme that Derrida borrows 
from Heidegger and Levinas - the Other, because it is an Other, always remains ultimately 
unreachable and unfathomable. 
73. See id. 
74. See id.; WHITE, supra note 71, at 262-63. 
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A. Justice as the Recognition of Singularity 
Derrida's demand that we see each situation in all its singularity is 
ambiguous. We could interpret it either as a claim of absolute differ-
ence among situations or only as one of relative difference. A claim of 
absolute difference means that we must see each situation as com-
pletely different from every other. A claim of relative difference means 
that we must see each situation as different from any other 'in some 
respects but not in others. Each situation is both different from and 
similar to every other situation; its uniqueness consists in the fact that 
this combination of similarity and difference manifests itself in differ-
ent ways for each situation to which it is compared. Thus, A and B are 
both similar to and different from C; but A and B are unique because 
they are similar to and different from C in different ways. 
We may state this distinction in another way. Consider three situ-
ations A, B, and C. They are all different. But are two of them more 
alike than the third? There are two positions we can take. One argues 
that all of them are absolutely different; consequently, no situation is 
any more like another than any other situation. The alternative posi-
tion would insist that we cannot answeJ.1 this question until we know 
what context the questioner has in mind. Given a particular context 
of decision, it will often be possible to say that two situations are more 
like each other than either is to a third; but this judgment may shjft 
radically if the context of judgment is sufficiently altered. If we are 
concerned only with the question of weight, an elephant and a truck 
are more alike than either is to an amoeba. Yet if the context of judg- · 
ment is shifted to the question of animate versus inanimate, the ele-
phant and the amoeba are more alike than either is to the truck. This 
alternative position asserts the relative similarity and difference of all 
situations. 
Does Derrida mean to suggest a theory of absolute difference or a 
theory of relative difference? If justice is an "infinite demand," per-
haps we must keep trying to view a situation as different from any 
other in every respect. That would presume a theory of infinite differ-
ence. Yet, if Derrida means that justice requires us to assert the abso-
lute difference of every situation, his claim is incoherent. It will be 
impossible to decide any case, because no case can be compared to any 
other. Because each case is completely different from all others, no 
case is a better point of comparison than any other. We cannot apply 
any consistent principle to different cases; hence, our judgment is 
merely one of fiat, for no decision is any more principled or unprinci-
pled than any other. Conversely, we might also say that a.II decisions 
are equally principled. Because there are no relative degrees of com-
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parison, any judgment is as good an exemplar of our principles as any 
other. 
If Derrida's claim is based on a notion of relative difference, how-
ever, it accurately describes the predicament of just decisionmaking. 75 
Each case is both similar to and different from every other, depending 
on how we look at it. The difficulty of just decisionmaking lies pre-
cisely in deciding what is the appropriate context of judgment. The 
question of principled consistency is the question of which cases our 
case is most like and which cases it is least like, given the appropriate 
context of judgment. 
Consider the recent example of a seventeen-year-old high school 
student who was sentenced by a judge in Thomaston, Georgia to three 
years in prison for stealing an ice cream bar from the school cafete-
ria. 76 The judge defended his decision on the grounds that the case 
was a burglary, and the penalty for burglary was three years. He ar-
gued that the appropriate context of judgment involved the definition 
of burglary, the legislature's decision to fix the age of majority at sev-
enteen, and his county's practice of uniform punishments for all viola-
tors of the same crime. His judgment was criticized on two grounds, 
each of which offered a competing context of judgment. First, what 
the student did was more like a schoolboy prank than a professional. 
breaking and entering. Second, on the same day the student was sen-
tenced to· three years, the judge gave suspended sentences and fines to 
several people convicted of drug possession and drunk driving. 77 
We can only criticize the judge's decision if we assume the relative 
difference of situations - that is, only if we argue that this situation is 
both different from and similar to others. In order to differentiate this 
case from an "ordinary" case of burglary, we must be able to say that 
this defendant was a student like other students, that his action was a 
prank like other schoolyard pranks. In order to argue that it is unfair 
that drug users and drunk drivers should receive a lesser penalty, we 
must be able to assess comparative degrees of responsibility and harm 
between situations. Yet this means that we must already be able to see 
these situations as similar in some respects; this similarity is necessary 
for them to be comparable or commensurable according to some com-
75. This interpretation seems most consistent with his criticisms of Levinas. See, e.g., 
DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE LIMIT 53-55, 68-72, 83-85 (1992); JACQUES 
DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 126-28 (Alan Bass trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1978) 
(1967); Guyora Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the Trial of Klaus Barbie, 
98 YALE L.J. 1321, 1376 (1989). 
76. Christopher Sullivan, Small Town Ponders Prison for Snickers Theft, AUSTIN AM. 
STATESMAN, Sept. 19, 1993, at AlO. 
77. Id. 
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mon metric. We cannot compare these situations if we assume that 
each is unique in the sense of absolutely different. We can only make 
such a judgment if we see each situation as relatively.different. Thus, 
justice may require that we understand each situation in its unique-
ness, but, ironically, this requires that we treat it like the situations 
that are most similar to it in the appropriate context of judgment. To 
recognize its uniqueness, we must also recognize its similarity to other 
situations. 
The same criterion of relative difference applies when we seek a 
just understanding of persons who are different from us. It is impor-
tant to try to understand and respect people who are different from us. 
To understand and respect their difference, however, we must first un-
derstand their similarity to us. We must try to see how their concerns 
and values are really similar to our concerns and our values, and thus, 
how the situation they find themselves in and their reactions to that 
situation make sense. At the same time, to grasp this similarity, to put 
ourselves in other people's shoes, we must recognize how our lives and 
theirs are different. That is why every attempt at understanding is a 
simultaneous assertion of commonality with and difference from the 
Other. If we unthinkingly assume that the Other is too much like us, 
we will never understand her actions when they diverge from our own; 
if we insist on our absolute difference from her, she will never be able 
to understand us. 
The competing interpretations of absolute and relative difference 
offer two different accounts of the predicament of judging. The theory 
of absolute difference suggests. that just judging is 'impossible because 
no situation is really like any other. All principled decisionmaking is 
completely indeterminate because we have no way of comparing situa-
tions when each is absolutely different. On the other hand, the theory 
of relative difference argues that doing justice is difficult because there 
are so many ways to see situations as similar as well as different. The 
problem is not that no two situations are ever similar; it is that there 
are too many ways in which situations are similar to each other, and 
we must try to parse out the right ways to assess this similarity. In 
other words, the secret of judging lies in determining the appropriate 
context of judgment. However, we can never fully determine the pres-
ent context, and we can never fully know of the presence or absence of 
other events that might significantly alter the context of our judgment 
when we decide a case. Therefore we are always uncertain - at least 
to some degree - about the justice of our decision. 
Note that the dependence of justice on context is much like the 
dependence of meaning on context. The indeterminacy of meaning 
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and the uncertainty of judgment are both based on the indefiniteness 
of context. This view is consistent with the transcendental approach 
to deconstruction. In contrast, an approach that asserts the infinite 
difference of each situation is just the flip side of an approach that 
asserts that meaning is infinite. The former asserts the absolute 
difference of all situations and all people, while the latter asserts the 
absolute identity of all meanings. Both approaches lead to normative 
nihilism and a failure of understanding. As before, Derrida's 
arguments only make sense if his is a transcendental account of 
deconstruction. 
B. Justice as Understanding the Other's Point of View 
Derrida's ethics of Otherness has a second component: It employs 
a different sense of individuality and uniqueness. Under this view, jus-
tice requires one to speak in the language of the Other by trying to see 
things from the Other's point of view.78 This conception of justice 
seems most attractive when we are the injurer or the stronger party in 
a relationship, or when we are in the position of a judge who is at-
tempting to arbitrate between competing claims. For example, sup-
pose that we are the State, the stronger party, the oppressor, or the 
injurer, or suppose that we are contemplating an action that might put 
us in such a position. It seems only just that we should try to under-
stand how we have injured or oppressed the Other (or might be in a 
position to injure or oppress). We can only do this if we try to see the 
problem from the Other's perspective and understand her pain and her 
predicament in all of its uniqueness. The duty we owe to the Other is 
the duty to see how our actions may affect or have affected the Other; 
to fulfill this duty we must put away our own preconceptions and vo-
cabulary and try to see things from her point of view. Similarly, if we 
are a judge in a case attempting to arbitrate between the parties, the 
ethics of Otherness demands that we try to understand how our deci-
sion will affect the two parties, and this will require us to see the mat-
ter from their perspective. 
Suppose, however, that we are not the injurer, but the victim; not 
the State, but the individual; not the strong, but the weak; not the 
oppressor, but the oppressed. Does justice require that we speak in the 
language of the person we believe is injuring or oppressing us? Must a 
rape victim attempt to understand her violation from the rapist's point 
of view? Does justice demand that she attempt to speak to the rapist 
in his own language - one which has treated her as less than human? 
78. See Derrida, supra note 4, at 949. 
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Must a concentration camp survivor address her former captor in the 
language of his worldview of Aryan supremacy? We might wonder 
whether this is what justice really requires, especially if the injustice 
we complain of is precisely that the Other failed to recognize us as a 
person, refused to speak in our language, and declined to consider our 
uniqueness and authenticity. 
When we move from Derrida's grand pronouncements on the eth-
ics of the Other to the place "where he lives," to his writings on Paul 
de Man, we see this pleasant formula properly deconstructed. Derrida 
both adopts and rejects the formula in different contexts. For exam-
ple, Derrida applies the formula when he demands that his critics read 
both him and de Man fairly. His first rule of just interpretation is 
"respect for the other, that is, for his right to difference, in his relation 
to others but also in his relation to himself."79 To judge de Man fairly, 
one must speak to de Man in his own language and read him in the 
proper context. 
Thus, Derrida insists that we evaluate de Man through the ethics 
of the Other. But what is the proper attitude to take toward de Man's 
critics? Derrida argues that he faces a serious problem: These critics 
cannot or will not read what he and de Man say; he describes them 
through the neologism ne pveulent pas lire - they can't/won't read. 80 
These critics have failed the call of justice; they have not been open to 
the Other - de Man and Derrida.81 What does justice demand of 
Derrida in defense of de Man? Here Derrida's practice deconstructs 
his theory: The essay Biodegradables cannot be described as anything 
other than a polemic. Derrida is perfectly aware of this but considers 
it unavoidable: 
I have never in my life taken the initiative of a polemic. Three or four 
times, and always in response, and always because I was invited to do so, I 
have simply tried to confront some manipulations that were too serious 
to ignore .... 
Of those who might regret the harshness or the high-handedness of 
certain of my remarks, right here, I ask - isn't it only fair? - to reread 
79. Derrida, Paul de Man's War, supra note 8, at 644. 
80. Derrida, Biodegradables, supra note 8, at. 823. Derrida combines the "p" in pouvoir (can) 
and the "v" in vouloir (want) to create the expression ''je ne pveux pas lire (I can/will not read)." 
Id. at 828; see also id. at 827, 843. 
81. Indeed, so egregious is their practice of reading that at one point Derrida wonders 
whether they can even be considered to be morally responsible for their actions. Id. at 823. 
Because the category of ne pveut pas lire "displaces the category of responsibility," Derrida in-
sists that he is not passing judgment on his critics: "Moreover, I bear these five no ill will; I have 
nothing against them; I would even like (if only in order to avoid this spectacle) to help them free 
themselves from this frightened, painful, and truly excessive hatred." Id. However, given the 
tone of the rest of the article, one might be pardoned if one were tempted to take these protesta-
tions of good will at less than face value. 
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one more time the critical responses. Then they will have a better mea-
sure of the aggression - its violence and its mediocrity - that has me as 
its victim . . . . It is not possible for me to respond on that level. And it 
is my duty not to accept it. One does not always decide by oneself on a 
high-handed tone. 82 
Justice, it seems, does not always demand that one speak in the 
language of the Other, especially when the Other is not playing by the 
same rules.83 Jesus might have advised his followers to tum the other 
cheek and to love their enemies, but this approach is not necessarily 
what justice requires or a particularly good strategy for achieving a 
just result. Not all encounters with an Other will involve willing par-
ticipants in an open dialogue. Nevertheless, justice demands that the 
oppressor answer for her wrong, whether or not she admits her fault. 
Even if she makes no answer to her victim, she must answer for her 
crime. Justice demands satisfaction, even (and especially) if the mis-
creant is unwilling to provide satisfaction. The answer that an oppres-
sive Other must provide to an oppressed Other - for example, a 
prison sentence or a money judgment - is not necessarily addressed 
to the victim in her language. It is not necessarily even understood by 
the injurer as an answer to the victim, or as an attempt to understand 
the victim in all of her singularity. Sometimes justice makes its de-
mand precisely when people will not understand each other, when 
they will not treat others as equals. 
Thus, perhaps unsurprisingly, justice demands that we deal with 
people and things not in a self-abnegating manner, but in the manner 
app:i;opriate to the situation before us. Centuries ago, Confucius ar-
gued that the virtuous man is one who knows both how to love people 
to the extent they are deserving of love, and to hate people to the ex-
tent that they are deserving of hate. 84 Justice demands that we speak 
in the language of the Other to the extent that it is appropriate to do so 
because this would further justice, but it equally demands that we not 
do so when it would increase injustice. 
82. Id. at 872. 
83. Indeed, Derrida insists, one does not even have to respond at all to accusations that are 
fundamentally unfair or disrespectful: 
Is it necessary to respond to every interpellation. to everyone no matter who, to every 
question, and especially to every public attack? The answer is "yes," it seems, when time 
and energy permit, to the extent to which the response keeps open, in spite of everything, a 
space of discussion. Without such a space no democracy and no community deserving of 
the name would survive. But the answer is "no" if the said interpellations fail to respect 
certain elementary rules, if they so lack decency or interest that the response risks shoring 
them up with a guarantee, confirming in some way a perversion of the said democratic 
discussion. Yet, in that case, it would be necessary that the nonresponse be appropriately 
interpreted as a sign of respect for certain principles and not as contempt for the questioner. 
Id. at 837. 
84. CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS 4:3 (D.C. Lau trans., Chinese Univ. Press 1983) (1979). 
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We may connect this point to our earlier criticism of the notion of 
a "responsibility without limits." Derrida has argued that the ethics 
of Otherness imposes upon us a responsibility to speak in the language 
of the Other. However, because justice is a responsibility without lim-
its, we might ask as before whether this responsibility to the Other is 
an infinite responsibility or merely an indefinite one. 
Thus, there are two different interpretations of the ethics of Other-
ness. The first imposes an infinite duty; the second imposes only an 
indefinite duty. The first corresponds to a nihilistic conception of 
deconstruction; the second to the transcendental conception. The re-
quirement of an infinite duty means that we must in every case use all 
the available means at our disposal to speak in the language of the 
Other; the requirement of an indefinite duty means we must make 
some attempt to speak in the language of the Other, and that the 
boundaries of our duty are uncertain and contextually driven. In the 
first case, the demand of justice is never satisfied because this demand 
is infinite; in the second case, we can never be certain that the demand 
of justice is satisfied because the duty it imposes is indefinite. 
All of the difficulties with the ethics of Otherness arise from the 
assumption that our responsibility to speak in the language of the 
Other is infinite. We can restate the difficulty by relating it to a similar 
problem in understanding the views of another. This is the problem of 
hermeneutic charity. When we try to understand what another person 
means, we usually do so by trying to envision how what they are say-
ing makes sense. As Hans-Georg Gadamer has argued, we must make 
an "anticipation of completion" that what another is saying is coher-
ent and has a claim to truth. 85 A stance of openness and interpretive 
charity is actually essential to the process of understanding. If we do 
not take this stance, we cannot be sure that our discovery of incoher-
ence or falsity in another's position is due to a defect in their argument 
or our inability to understand it fully. 86 
In other words, when attempting to understand another person, 
especially a person with a different world view from our own, we must 
be open to the possibility that the truth is more on their side than ours, 
that what they are saying is really true and valid - indeed, more true 
and valid than our own beliefs. Thus, we must be open to the possibil-
ity that our encounter with the Other will change our own views about 
what is true and good. 87 Understanding, then, is a kind of vulnerabil-
85. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 261-62 (Garrett Barden & John Cum-
ming eds. & Sheed & Ward Ltd. trans., Seabury Press 1975) (1960). 
86. See id. at 263. 
87. Cf. id. at 262. 
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ity or openness to the truth that the Other may have to express. 88 It 
always requires the possibility that our beliefs will be changed through 
our encounter with the Other. Indeed, Gadamer argues, if we do not 
come to our encounter with this hermeneutic openness, we can never 
achieve real understanding; at most we achieve a halfway measure, in 
which we withhold ourselves from true understanding because we 
withhold ourselves from the necessary hermeneutic vulnerability.89 
The duty of hermeneutic charity in Gadamer's theory of interpre-
tation strongly resembles Derrida's version of the ethics of Otherness. 
Given the common influence of Heidegger on both thinkers, this com-
monality should not be surprising. Yet Gadamer's duty of interpretive 
charity and openness to the object of interpretation raises a serious 
difficulty. If this duty is endless, it is hard to distinguish this duty 
from a duty to reach an agreement with the person we are trying to 
understand. We do not know, in other words, at what point we should 
cease our efforts to see the truth in the views of the other party and 
simply recognize that they are wrong or that their argument is inco-
herent. If we go too far, we risk the danger of what I call hermeneutic 
cooptation. 90 By repeatedly blaming the incoherence or wrongness of 
the argument of another solely on our insufficient failure to under-
stand it, we place all the responsibility for intellectual change upon 
ourselves. There is the danger that our drive to understand the truth 
in the other person's views will lead us to be coopted by those views 
and brought into agreement with things we should not agree with, be-
cause they are false, misleading, or unjust.91 
There is a further difficulty. If the Other's views treat us as objects 
or as persons who deserve no respect, the requirement of continual 
hermeneutic charity will require us to adopt ways of thinking and talk-
ing that are unjust to ourselves. That is why we hesitate to think that 
justice requires that a political prisoner strive to speak in the language 
of her former torturers, or that a Holocaust survivor attempt to under-
stand her own situation in the language of Aryan supremacy. To re-
quire this sort of understanding is to require these people to injure 
themselves psychically through the duty of understanding. For want 
of a better name, let us call this the requirement of hermeneutic mas-
ochism. True justice toward another should never involve hermeneu-
tic cooptation, and it should never require hermeneutic masochism. 
An infinite responsibility to speak in the language of the Other ere-
88. See id. at 262. 
89. Id. at 270. 
90. See Balkin, supra note 27, at 163. 
91. Id. at 160-61, 167-69. 
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ates the perpetual danger of hermeneutic cooptation and hermeneutic 
masochism. It leads to the ridiculous spectacle of the rape victim be-
ing asked to understand that, in the eyes of her attacker, she was really 
just an object for subordination and conquest. It leads to the conclu-
sion that blacks should be more understanding when white police of-
ficers automatically assume that they are likely to be criminals. 92 An 
infinite responsibility to speak in the language of the Other can easily 
lead to perpetual justification of the Other, no matter how unreasona-
ble their position. This is not what justice requires. 
The postulation of an infinite duty is untenable. Yet we might still 
make sense of the ethics of Otherness by viewing the duty to under-
stand as indefinite rather than infinite. We have some duty to speak in 
the language of the Other, but our duty is not infinite. Instead, justice 
demands that we make just the right amount of effort to understand 
the Other. Beyond that point, it is not only appropriate but necessary 
for us to recognize that the Other's views are incoherent or unjustified, 
and that our own position is more reasonable. We have a duty to be 
open to and absorb that part of the Other's point of view which fur-
thers justice while disagreeing with the rest. 
But if we have this responsibility, how will we know when to cease 
our efforts at understanding? How will we know when we have done 
all that justice requires? We cannot know the full contours of our 
responsibility in advance of our encounter with the Other. Each situa-
tion will be different, and our responsibility in each situation will 
depend heavily on the context of the encounter. Hence our responsi-
bility to the Other, while not infinite, is nevertheless indefinite. 
There is a further reason why our duty to the Other must be indefi-
nite. It has to do with the symmetrical nature of Otherness.93 We are 
always an Other to the person who is an Other to us. The ethics of 
Otherness seems most appealing when we sympathize with the Other 
because the Other is the oppressed, the victim, or a potential object of 
injustice. However, we cannot state as a general rule that only the 
oppressor needs to speak in the language of the oppressed, or the in-
jurer in the language of the victim. An additional problem of indefi-
niteness arises because these categories are not always clearly defined. 
In different contexts, and from different perspectives, different people 
appear to be strong or weak, injurer or victim, oppressor or oppressed, 
judge or judged. 
First, the roles of the two parties may shift radically depending on 
92. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 46, 58-79 (1991). 
93. See CORNELL, supra note 75, at 54; DERRIDA, supra note 75, at 128. 
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how one describes the situation. Consider two neighbors who make 
conflicting uses of their property. Suppose that Neighbor One needs 
to operate machinery to run her business while Neighbor Two needs 
peace and quiet for her health. The second neighbor regards the first 
neighbor as an injurer; Neighbor One should try to understand how 
important it is for Neighbor Two to have peace and quiet. But Neigh-
bor One has a symmetrical complaint. If she has to stop operating her 
machine, she will go out of business. Neighbor Two's demand is un-
reasonable under the circumstances, and justice requires that Neigh-
bor Two understand the significant costs her request will impose on 
Neighbor One.94 In this situation each party is an Other to the other, 
and each is an Other to the judge who must decide the case. Thus 
there are at least four different potential duties to respond. Both 
neighbors must make some effort to understand the position of the 
Other, but the roles of oppressor and oppressed, victim and injurer, 
are not determined in advance. Similarly, the judge must attempt to 
understand the situation of each neighbor from each neighbor's per-
spective, but the extent of this duty depends on which neighbor is act-
ing unjustly toward the other, and this is the very question that the 
judge must decide. 
Thus, the scope of the duty owed to speak in the language of the 
Other depends on our definition of the roles of the parties - as victim 
or injurer, strong or weak - but this definition will in turn be affected 
by the scope of the duty to speak in the language of the Other. For 
example, the more we try to see things from Neighbor One's perspec-
tive, the clearer it may become that Neighbor Two is being unreasona-
ble, oppressive, and playing the role of the potential injurer. Yet the 
opposite conclusion might follow if we attempt to see the situation 
from Neighbor Two's perspective. The scope of our duty to speak in 
the language of the Other does not exist before we decide what their 
respective roles are, but the roles each plays cannot fully be deter-
mined before we fix the scope of the duty; each feature of the situation 
provides the proper context in which the other feature is to be judged. 
Because of the mutual dependence and differentiation of these con-
texts, the scope of the duty toward the Other is indefinite. It is neither 
infinite nor nonexistent, but dependent on facts and circumstances 
that are never fully clear, and whose precise contours we cannot fully 
determine .in advance. Thus, the duty to speak in the language of the 
Other becomes a duty without limits, but it is by no means an infinite 
duty as Derrida suggests. 
94. This example draws on the familiar Coasean point that both parties are causal factors in 
their conflicting use. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 2 (1960). 
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The difficulty that produces indefiniteness may be subdivided into 
two problems: Let us call them the problem of certainty and the prob-
lem of proportion or degree. The problem of certainty arises when we 
cannot be sure whether a person is in fact an oppressor or an op-
pressed person. Justice may require us to decide this question, rather 
than use it as a basis for determining just action. Suppose a criminal 
defendant is accused of rape. If he really raped the victim, he is an 
oppressor. Justice demands that he recognize how he has harmed his 
victim and answer for his crime. If he is innocent, however, he will be 
oppressed if the State fails to do justice to him. The State must there-
fore ensure that it hears his story and understands the situation from 
his point of view; it must make sure that it does not convict him based 
on false evidence or unreasoning stereotypes. At the same time, it 
must not unthinkingly accept every piece of exculpatory evidence and 
every exculpatory account the defendant might offer, for that might 
create an equal and opposite injustice. In a criminal case we cannot 
determine in advance whether a person is guilty or innocent; that is 
precisely the purpose of a criminal trial. Given this situation, does 
justice demand that we speak to the defendant in his language or that 
he speak to us in our own? Our uncertainty in this regard leads to the 
indefiniteness of the duty. 
The problem of degree arises because a person may at one and the 
same time be an injurer or oppressor to some degree and a victim or an 
oppressed person to another degree. Suppose that we are quite sure 
that a criminal defendant is guilty of rape. He nevertheless deserves to 
be treated with some respect; for example, the State should not be 
permitted to torture him to extract a confession, and it must give him 
an opportunity to defend himself in court. His crime may be less bad 
than other crimes of the same sort; if so, justice requires that he be 
given a chance to produce exculpatory evidence, and the State has a 
duty to consider it and lessen his sentence to the appropriate extent. If 
the State fails to protect the defendant's rights, he may be in the posi-
tion of an oppressed party, despite his horrible crime. Thus, the State 
has a duty to speak in his language with respect to some features of the 
situation, but not with respect to others. These complications also 
produce an indefinite duty. 
The case of Paul de Man is a perfect example of the indefiniteness 
of our duty toward the Other. The entire debate surrounding de Man 
concerns what role he should be assigned. Is de Man a victim of un-
just accusation or a person who unjustly accused others (Jews)? Was 
he a collaborator, an ambitious man without a moral compass who 
sought to forget his sordid past, or was he an immature youth who 
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made an early mistake yet matured into a respected scholar? The 
question of his status is inextricable from the question of what it 
means to be fair to him. Moreover, even if de Man willingly wrote 
antisemitic literature, justice requires that he be condemned only to 
the extent that he is responsible, but not to the extent that he is not 
responsible. In order to be fair to de Man, we must try to understand 
what he did and wrote, and this endeavor may require us to under-
stand how he understood his actions and his writings. Nevertheless, 
we do not have to accept everything he said or did at face value or 
interpret every one of hi~ writings or actions so as to exculpate him, 
just as we should not deliberately interpret his life in its worst possible 
light. Our duty of fairness is indefinite, but not infinite in either direc-
tion - toward exculpation or inculpation. We can be unjust either by 
refusing to speak in the language of the Other or by exclusively adopt-
ing that tongue. 
Note that we cannot avoid these difficulties by insisting that all 
parties, whether victim or injurer, oppressor or oppressed, have an 
equal and infinite duty to speak in the language of the Other. An 
equal and infinite duty on all sides leads to either incoherence or injus-
tice. It means that the rapist and the rape victim have equal duties to 
understand each other in terms of each other's conception of each 
other, and this requirement permits neither a determinable decision 
nor a just one. Justice demands that each "speak in the language of 
the Other" to the proper amount, to the proper degree, and in the 
proper circumstances. This duty is without limits not because it is 
infinite but because it is indefinite - because the question of duty to 
the Other is bound up with the very description of the situation which 
the duty concerns. 
An indefinite duty, like an indefinite responsibility, is "without 
limits" because its contours are context boun:d and because this con-
text cannot be fully determined in advance. What would an indefinite 
duty toward the Other mean? It would be a duty that can never fully 
be satisfied. However, it cannot be satisfied because we are uncertain 
about its scope, not because the demand is infinite.95 
95. We should not confuse the question whether our responsibility to the Other is infinite or 
indefinite with still another reason why the demand of justice may remain unsatisfied in a partic-
ular case: the impossibility of a commensurable remedy. Often subsequent reparations for an 
injury never seem adequate to compensate for a previous loss. But this impossibility is not be· 
cause either the loss or the responsibility for the loss is infinite, in the sense of having a limitless 
magnitude. Rather, the problem is one of incommensurability between the loss and any remedy 
we could offer. This incommensurability arises from the fact that our lives change in response to 
the events that happen to us. Our situation after an injury cannot be made fully commensurable 
with the situation before because both we and the world around us have changed as a result and 
can never be the same again. The past, precisely because it is past, can never fully be redeemed. 
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Previously we identified the concept of an infinite responsibility 
with normative nihilism. The notion of an infinite duty to speak in the 
language of the Other - which is a total abandonment of ourselves to 
the language of the Other - also leads to a kind of nihilism. Hoping 
to efface the distinction between self and Other, we succeed only in 
effacing the self and its language, just as the effacement of all distinc-
tions leads to the destruction of meaning. This endeavor leads to a 
"nihilism of the self." The preservation of the self is the preservation 
of its Otherness from the Other, which is also the preservation of its 
partial similarity to the Other, and a source of the indefiniteness of its 
duty toward the Other. When we understand deconstruction to re-
quire an indefinite obligation, we preserve the self and make sense of 
the demand of justice; but when we understand deconstruction to re-
quire an infinite demand, it must lead to effacement or nihilism. 
IV. DECONSTRUCTION AS AN "ANTITOTALITARIAN" 
FORM OF ANALYSIS 
Derrida's final suggestion connects deconstruction to an opposition 
to totalitarianism in thought. Derrida insists that what he has always 
practiced under the name of deconstruction "has always seemed to me 
favorable, indeed destined (it is no doubt my principal motivation) to 
the analysis of ... totalitarianism in all its forms, which cannot always 
be reduced to names of regimes."96 He finds examples of totalitarian 
thinking in criticisms of Paul de Man; since these critics are so con-
cerned with denouncing political totalitarianism, he argues, they 
should avoid reproducing the logic of totalitarianism in their judg-
ments and readings.97 In fact, deconstructive analysis, which they at-
tack, is the best way to avoid totalitarian logic: "[D]econstructions 
have always represented ... the at least necessary condition for identi-
fying and combating the totalitarian risk" in discourse. 98 
What is a "totalitarian" logic of discourse or a "totalitarian" ges-
The nature and direction of our lives have been irrevocably altered by previous actions and 
events; we become different people because of what has happened to us. 
Thus, if the defendant accidentally breaks the plaintiff's leg, she may be deeply sorry for what 
she has done. Yet her action has affected the lives of others in a way that cannot fully be re-
paired, no matter what good deeds she later performs, and no matter how much assistance she 
offers to the victim and the victim's family. In such circumstances, the reason why the injurer's 
responsibility can never be fully satisfied is not because it is infinite in magnitude. The problem is 
that any remedy we could offer will be of the wrong kind, because we cannot relive the past. 
Thus, the fact that we live our lives in unidirectional time by itself can make subsequent remedies 
for finite harms incommensurable and hence essentially and perpetually inadequate. 
96. Derrida, Paul de Man's War, supra note 8, at 648. 
97. Id. at 645. 
98. Id. at 647. 
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ture in discourse? Derrida seems to identify it with various forms of 
oversimplification, falsification, or rushing to judgment. His examples 
describe features that he finds objectionable in various critical readings 
of de Man's work: 
purification, purge, totalization, reappropriation, homogenization, rapid 
objectification, good conscience, stereotyping and nonreading, immedi-
ate politicization or depoliticization (the two always go together), imme-
diate historicization or dehistoricization (it is always the same thing), 
immediate ideologizing moralization (immorality itself) of all the texts 
and all the problems, expedited trial, condemnations, or acquittals, sum-
mary executions or sublimations. This is what must be deconstructed.99 
All of these sins of reading and understanding share an inattention 
- whether willful or innocent - to problems of context. They over-
simplify by failing to spend the time or effort to see the multifaceted 
and complicated textures of meaning that attend any text or any 
event.100 The totalitarian gesture, then, is oversimplification and inat-
tention to complexity and context; the antitotalitarian gesture, which 
is just, is a corresponding attention to these features of texts. 
Of course, a judgment whether one is being insufficiently sensitive 
to context is itself a contextual judgment. For example, in some con-
texts, dismissing another's arguments, making categorical distinctions, 
and even rushing to judgment may not be an entirely bad practice. 101 
Derrida denies that "we have access to a complete formalization of 
this [totalitarian] logic" or can be absolutely exterior to it. 102 There is 
no "systematic set of themes, concepts, philosophemes, forms of utter-
ance, axioms, evaluations, hierarchies which, forming a closed and 
identifiable coherence of what we call totalitarianism, fascism, nazism, 
racism, antisemitism, never appear outside these formations and espe-
cially never on the opposite side."103 Indeed, there is no "systematic 
coherence proper to each of them, since one must not confuse them 
too quickly with each other."104 Conversely, there is no discursive act 
which is completely antitotalitarian, for there is no "property so closed 
and so pure that one may not find any element of these systems in 
discourses that are commonly opposed to them." 105 
Derrida's identification of deconstructive argument with antitotal-
99. Id. at 646. 
100. Id. at 645. 
101. For example, Derrida himself thinks it important to condemn Nazism and political 
totalitarianism in all of their forms. See id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
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itarianism is really a special case of his critique of logocentrism. The 
problem oflogocentrism is the problem of categorical judgment. Cate-
gorical judgments are judgments that employ categories; whenever we 
predicate a property of an object, we place it in a category. We say 
that it is this way rather than that, that it goes into this box rather 
than another. In fact, categorical judgments are necessary to our 
thought; they are the basis of all judgments of similarity and differ-
ence. Of course the term categorical has another meaning as well -
insensitivity to context. Categorical obligations are unconditional; to 
state something categorically is to assert it without regard to (at least 
some types of) context. Thus, categorical judgments, because they are 
categorical, are to some degree acontextual. They must lump some 
things together as similar and exclude others as different, without at-
tending to the similarities across, or the differences within, the bound-
aries that they establish. Hence every categorical judgment is a sort of 
falsification or oversimplification of the situation. Of course that is 
precisely why categories are useful. In a world of infinite diversity, 
change, and differentiation, categories gather things together and treat 
them as similar so that the human mind can understand the world 
before it. One might think of categories, then, as heuristics that aid 
understanding through partial simplification.106 
What is most remarkable about categorical judgment, then, is that 
it is simultaneously useful, adequate, and empowering in some con-
texts and deficient, inadequate, and misleading in others. We cannot 
do without categorical judgments of some type, yet if we do not pay 
sufficient attention to the context in which we make them, they may 
lead us away from what is true and what is just. Deconstruction helps 
us to recognize the discrepancy between the categorical judgments we 
make and the context our judgment overlooks. A perfectly just treat-
ment of a situation would require us to understand the situation in all 
of its contextual richness. 107 Nevertheless, we must make categorical 
judgments of some type to articulate the very context we seek to un-
cover. Context itself must be describable in terms that are unavoid-
ably categorical. Hence the process of deconstructive analysis, while 
106. Although this sort of argument is generally associated with conceptual relativism, we 
should note that it is perfectly consistent with a realist ontology. One might believe that linguis-
tic categories lump together objects that are really similar in some respects, although different in 
others, and that the grounds of this similarity and difference are not simply a matter of human 
convention. 
107. Thus, Derrida insists, "one must analyze as far as possible this process of formalization 
and its program so as to uncover the statements, the philosophical, ideological, or political be-
haviors that derive from it and wherever they-may be found." Derrida, Paul de Man's War, 
supra note 8, at 646. 
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"urgent," is also "interminable."108 Deconstruction becomes "the 
tireless analysis (both theoretical and practical) of ... adherences"109 
to the totalitarian discourses that remain lodged even in one's own 
ways of thinking and which one is trying to combat. 
Indeed, in articulating his point, Derrida falls prey to the very dan-
ger he warns against. Derrida labels all the various forms of oversim-
plification and acontextual judgment as "totalitarian."110 But this 
comparison is itself a gross overstatement and highly misleading. To 
be sure, totalitarian regimes may make use of simplistic slogans and 
lump various persons together into categories of undesirables, but it 
hardly follows that every oversimplification deserves the name "totali-
tarian," especially given the powerful connotations that usually ac-
company this word. In Derrida's terms this comparison is in itself an 
oversimplification, a "totalitarian" move that provides Derrida's at-
tack on de Man's critics with much more rhetorical force than it really 
deserves. It would be more appropriate - and more just - to argue 
that these critics do not read de Man in the proper context and with 
the proper degree of charity; but this accusation, even if true, in no 
way justifies the claim that, in misreading de Man, they are reproduc-
ing the logic of totalitarian discourse. 
In fact, when we strip away its more obfuscating elements, Der-
rida's identification of deconstruction with antitotalitarianism is really 
better expressed in terms of deconstruction's continual allegiance to 
transcendental human values, which law, language, and convention 
never fully serve and always partially obscure. We deconstruct cate-
gorical judgments because they take us further away from truth; we 
deconstruct legal categories because they deviate from what is just. 
Nevertheless, a deconstruction in the service of justice is always pre-
mised on the possibility of reconstruction - that is, on the hope of 
some categorical scheme that would better articulate the appropriate 
context of judgment. If we do not believe that there is a better descrip-
tion, there is no point in deconstructing in the first place. We are sim-
ply substituting one description for another, without any assertion that 
one is better than another. 
Does this practice in fact presuppose a transcendental norm of jus-
tice? We might deconstruct only in order to show that a categorical 
judgment fails to live up to the norms of our particular culture or legal 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 648. 
110. See id. at 645 ("Such a formalizing, saturating totalization seems to me to be precisely 
the essential character of this logic whose project, at least, and whose ethico-political conse· 
quence can be terrifying."). 
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system. In that case the ultimate ground of our deconstruction is to 
obtain increasing fidelity to positive norms. However, such a practice 
places the positive norms beyond criticism because they are the basis 
of deconstructive critique. Yet one can easily imagine cases in which 
this very refusal to critique positive norms would itself be totalitarian. 
However, to say that positive norms are inadequate - and hence 
in order to deconstruct them - we must refer to values that lie be-
yond the norms we are critiquing and that serve as the source of our 
criticism, even if we believe that the values we wish to uphold are to 
some extent realized in our culture. Suppose that we denied that we 
need concern ourselves with transcendental values: Suppose we assert 
that we are only interested in engaging in an "immanent" critique. In 
other words, we say that we are using one aspect of our cultural norms 
to critique other aspects, and therefore we need make no reference to 
anything beyond the positive norms of our culture. For example, we 
might use the commitment to equality expressed in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964111 to criticize the lack of civil rights for homosexuals in 
the United States. The question remains, however, why we saw a par-
ticular aspect of our cultural practices as a worthy basis for our cri-
tique and another aspect as unworthy. Since both are equally aspects 
of our culture, culture by itself cannot serve as a norm to decide be-
tween them. 
We might say that one is a more central feature of our cultural 
norms than the other, but this leads to two different interpretations. If 
something is central because it is more prevalent, we refer only to a 
positive norm. Yet mere prevalence does not guarantee th~ worth of a 
cultural practice, unless our only goal is to reinforce positive norms for 
their own sake. For example, racial inequality may be central to a 
regime of Jim Crow or apartheid, but this fact does not make it a 
worthy basis for a critique of egalitarian norms that might exist else-
where in the culture. Indeed, by reinforcing the most prevalent prac-
tices of a culture, we may reinforce its most deeply unfair elements. 
On the other hand, by "central" we could mean "more valuable" or 
"more just." In that case our judgment must also refer to a transcen-
dent conception of value. or justice that informs our notion of central-
ity. Thus, whenever we speak of the proper continuation of positive 
norms or about deciding between alternative interpretations of positive 
norms, we must eventually make use of transcendental norms of jus-
tice. Although we may find these norms partially realized in portions 
111. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended principally at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a 
to 2000h-6 (1988)). 
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of our own culture, these inadequate articulations do not exhaust their 
meaning for us. 
V. DECONSTRUCTION AS A NORMATIVE CHASM 
I want to conclude this essay by juxtaposing two different claims. I 
began this essay by noting that the normative import of any particular 
deconstructive argument depends largely upon what the deconstructor 
chooses to deconstruct, and the values and commitments that she 
brings to her act of deconstruction. As we have seen, 112 Derrida tends 
to pick targets for deconstruction that correspond to the injustices he 
perceives. He deconstructs inegalitarian conceptions, but not egalita-
rian ones; he deconstructs the cultural practice of apartheid and West-
ern practices that support it, but not arguments against apartheid; he 
deconstructs unfair accusations of Paul de Man, but not those assess-
ments which he believes to be fair. At the same time, I have argued 
for a transcendental version of deconstruction: When we employ 
deconstruction to discuss questions of justice, we always refer to the 
discrepancy between human law, culture, and convention, and the 
human values which they articulate. 
When we put these two claims together, we arrive at a curious 
problem. If deconstruction makes reference to transcendental values, 
why should the results of deconstructive argument tum on the target 
of our deconstruction? How is it possible that deconstructive argu-
ments can be wielded for contrary purposes? Why isn't deconstructive 
argument always a force for good? 
In the three essays I have discussed, Derrida does not deal ade-
quately with the many difficult questions concerning the ethics of 
deconstructive argument. He is preoccupied with showing that decon-
struction is not necessarily nihilistic.113 Nevertheless, he never offers 
much of an argument for why deconstructive argument cannot lead to 
contradictory normative positions or even be used to promote injus-
tice. In Biodegradables, he does little more than scoff at the notion 
that one can use deconstruction to promote both good and evil polit-
ical regimes; he demands proof that deconstruction could ever be used 
112. See supra notes 9, 15, 31-40 and accompanying text. 
113. For example, he insists that deconstruction does not "correspond (though certain peo-
ple have an interest in spreading this confusion) to a quasi-nihilistic abdication before the ethico-
politico-juridical question of justice and before the opposition between just and unjust." Derrida, 
supra note 4, at 953. But this failure of correspondence may mean either that deconstruction -
properly employed and understood - need not lead to injustice, or that it cannot do so. Even if 
people do not use deconstructive arguments to efface the distinction between the just and the 
unjust, they might still use deconstructive arguments to argue for what is unjust through sophis-
tical means. 
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for a bad purpose. 114 This burden is easily met, however: As the first 
part of this essay shows, it takes very little effort to produce numerous 
examples of deconstructive arguments that point in opposite direc-
tions.115 In his Cardozo Law School address, Derrida tries a different 
tack. He seems to suggest that any example of deconstruction that 
leads to injustice is not really deconstructive, just as no example of law 
is ever fully just. In his view, both deconstruction and justice are im-
possible. Thus, deconstruction itself can never be unjust; in fact, Der-
rida asserts, "Deconstruction is justice."116 In these passages, Derrida 
simply offers a mystical equation between justice and deconstruction; 
he strings together provocative metaphysical formulas but does not 
begin to offer a convincing argument for them. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to make sense of deconstruction's 
proper relationship to justice, and, in the process, to offer a more char-
itable interpretation of Derrida's rather obscure discussion. To solve 
this quandary, let us distinguish between deconstructive arguments 
made by human beings, which we might call the rhetorical practice of 
deconstruction, and the relationship of mutual dependence and differ-
entiation that exists between human values and human language, con-
vention, and culture. In this relationship, human conventions 
articulate human values but never fully capture them. Let us call this 
relationship of simultaneous inadequacy and dependence the norma-
tive chasm between inchoate human values and their cultural 
articulations. 117 . 
What is the relationship of the rhetorical practice of deconstructive 
argument to this normative chasm? When people make deconstruc-
tive arguments about justice, they make use of this chasm in two ways. 
First, their arguments implicitly rely on values which, to some indefi-
nite degree, transcend human conventions. Second, their critiques 
partially describe the discrepancy between law, convention, and cul-
ture and the human values of justice and truth. Yet deconstructive 
arguments that make use of this normative chasm are not themselves 
identical to this chasm, nor do they ever articulate it completely. In-
114. See, e.g., Derrida, Biodegradab/es, supra note 8, at 827 (rejecting the claim of a critic 
that deconstruction can be used for either "fascist" or "liberal'' purposes and demanding "some 
proof, please, some arguments, some examples, at least one example!"). 
115. See supra text accompanying notes 40-45; see also Balkin, supra note 3, at 1613-25 
(offering competing readings of a U.S. Supreme Court opinion on parental rights). 
116. Derrida, supra note 4, at 945. 
117. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Plato was among the first philosophers to stress this relation-
ship; it is a principal motivation for his theory of Forms. Cf SEUNG, supra note 24, at 209-10. 
Nevertheless, one does not have to accept the entire ontological baggage of the Forms to ac-
knowledge Plato's genius in recognizing this fundamental inadequacy between our indeterminate 
values and their articulations in the world of culture. 
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deed, because human values are inchoate and indeterminate and 
human conventions are indefinite in their reach and scope, the rela-
tionship between the two is doubly problematic. It may even be mis-
leading to think of this normative gap as a single, homogenous thing 
that any mind could ever grasp or describe as a totality. Thus, there 
are two things that human law, language, and convention fail ade-
quately to capture: The first are the human values on the other side of 
the normative chasm; the second is the chasm itself. 
The human practice of deconstructive argument always involves a 
limited use of the normative gap between value and articulation. It is 
limited in two senses. First, a deconstructive argument must always 
begin somewhere, at a certain place or with a certain target. Each 
deconstructive argument shows the instability of the distinctions with 
which it starts, and the mutual dependence and differentiation of the 
conceptual oppositions it targets. Yet these deconstructive arguments 
themselves must rely on distinctions and conceptual oppositions, 
otherwise they could not be expressed in language and understood by 
others. Furthermore, no deconstructive argument destabilizes all of 
the conceptual structures in language or culture at once; for every dis-
tinction it contests, it leaves unexamined thousands more. Thus, every 
deconstructive argument fails ultimately to offer an adequate account 
of the normative chasm; instead it examines and articulates only a lit-
tle part of this phenomenon, using conceptual tools that are already 
symptoms and effects of this chasm. 
Second, each deconstructive argument must come to an end. It 
generally ends with a conclusion that a particular distinction or set of 
distinctions is effaced, undecidable, or more complicated than one had 
first imagined. It ends when the deconstructor believes that she has 
reached an appropriate degree of enlightenment from the process of 
deconstructive argument. 118 For example, Derrida ends his essay on 
de Man by showing that de Man's situation is more complicated than 
his critics thought. So deconstruction as practiced by human beings 
always arrives at a conclusion in two senses of the word - both an 
end and a result of reasoning. Yet the decision to stop and assess the 
conclusions of one's argument, to state them as conclusions - in both 
senses of that word - leaves unspoken the many further steps that 
could be taken. These additional steps could lead to a partial or even a 
complete transformation of the conclusions just arrived at. Thus, 
from another perspective, the conclusion of a deconstructive argument 
is a conclusion in neither sense of the word: for it does not end the 
118. See Balkin, supra note 1, at 766. 
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possible lines of deconstructive argument, nor does it lead to a fixed 
and determinate result. 
We thus obtain the curious result that the discrepancy between 
value and articulation that makes each human practice of deconstruc-
tion possible is itself indescribable through the finite rhetorical prac-
tice of deconstruction. One might try to imagine a God's-eye point of 
view from which all the mutual differentiations and dependences, all 
the uncanny reversals and undoings of human conceptual structures, 
could be understood and appreciated. But such a view is not possible 
for any human intelligence. Thus, the rhetorical practice of decon-
structive argument is always inadequate to express the predicament of 
human culture that makes this sort of argument possible. 
It is possible that, when Derrida speaks of "Deconstruction" in his 
more mystical pronouncements, he has in mind something like this 
normative chasm, this essential inadequation between transcendent 
human values and human culture. If so, then no human practice of 
deconstructive argument is "Deconstruction," because no argument 
ever fully describes the relationship between value and articulation. 
Indeed, such a complete description would be impossible. It would 
not follow, however, that "Deconstruction" itself was impossible, only 
a fully adequate account of it. So Derrida's equation between L..::con-
struction and justice is flawed. Justice is "impossible" only in the 
sense that one never finds a fully and categorically just act in this 
world. Yet "Deconstruction" is not impossible, even though one 
never finds a fully deconstructive argument. The relationship of mu-
tual dependence and differentiation that exists between culture and 
value is not impossible; it is the case. Moreover, it is simply not true, 
as Derrida asserts, that Deconstruction is justice. This assertion is a 
confusion of the normative chasm between culture and value with a 
particular inchoate and indefinite human value. Derrida's mystical 
formula simply obscures a valuable insight. 119 
119. In other words, if Derrida were correct that Deconstruction is justice because both are 
impossible of attainment, then Deconstruction would not only be justice, but also beauty, wis-
dom, and temperance, as none of these virtues is perfectly realized in this world. A more appro-
priate view would be Derrida's assertion that "deconstruction takes place in the interval that 
separates the undeconstructibility of justice from the deconstructibility of droit (authority, legiti-
macy, and so on)." Derrida, supra note 4, at 945 (first emphasis added). In other words, Decon-
struction is the gap itself, rather than one side or another of this gap. 
If by Deconstruction Derrida means this normative gap, Deconstruction would not even be 
an activity of human beings. Instead Deconstruction would simply be the case that there is a 
fundamental inadequation. Thus, elsewhere Derrida suggests that "[d]econstruction takes place, 
it is an event that does not await the deliberation, consciousness, or organization of a subject, or 
even of modernity. It deconstructs it-self." Letter from Jacques Derrida to a Japanese Friend 4, 
reprinted in DERRIDA AND DIFFERANCE l-5 (David Wood & Robert Bernasconi eds., 1988) 
[hereinafter Letter from Derrida]. This "it," Derrida insists, "is not ... an impersonal thing that 
is opposed to some egological subjectivity." Id. It is not the result of a subject applying a force 
1180 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:1131 
This account of Deconstruction also explains two other puzzling 
Derridean statements. The first is Derrida's insistence that Decon-
struction is not a method or a technique. 120 The second is his asser-
tion that Deconstruction itself, like justice, is not deconstructible. 121 
Derrida's repeated denial that deconstruction is a method or a 
practice - and therefore, unlike these denials, not repeatable - has 
struck many as strange and possibly a clever way of dodging criticism: 
if deconstruction is not a method, then only a certain elect- presum-
ably Jacques Derrida and his followers - can tell whether a given 
argument is truly deconstructive or not. They can thus disown all 
examples that put their practices in a bad light. Whether or not Der-
rida has sought to shield himself from criticism through obfuscation, 
there is another, more charitable way of accounting for his statements. 
Derrida's insistence on separating deconstruction from "method,, is 
consistent with a view of Deconstruction as a normative chasm that 
cannot adequately be captured by any human rhetorical practice of 
deconstructive argument. This chasm is not part of any conventional 
practice of deconstruction; rather, it is what these conventions imper-
fectly articulate. The human practices of deconstructive argument are 
conventional, repeatable, transmissible, and hence deconstructible. In 
contrast, Deconstruction - which is the case that there is an in-
describable inadequacy between human values and their articulations 
- is not a convention, and hence it is not deconstructible. 122 
Nevertheless, it follows that deconstructive arguments are surely 
part of a practice or convention of deconstructive rhetoric. This claim 
has two consequences. First, the practice of deconstructive argument 
is as deconstructible as any other set of conventional understandings 
and practices. This resolves the question left unanswered earlier in 
this essay. We noted that if deconstruction argument were a repeat-
able rhetorical practice, expressible through repeatable linguistic signs 
and conventions, it would be subject to "ideological drift,,: The inser-
tion of deconstructive arguments into new and different contexts 
would result in arguments with widely varying political and moral va-
lences. This would mean both (1) that deconstructive arguments 
to an object. It would perhaps be better to say simply that "Deconstruction happens,'' or "There 
is Deconstruction". 
120. See Letter from Derrida, supra note 119, at 3. 
121. Derrida, supra note 4, at 945. 
122. A similar argument would apply to justice. Only human culture, law, and convention 
are deconstructible because, and to the extent that, they depend upon but vary from inchoate 
human values. A human value like justice would not be deconstructible, although any particular 
articulation of it would be, just as the normative gap - Deconstruction itself - would not be 
deconstructible, although any particular articulation of it would be. 
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could be used for a variety of different political purposes, depending 
on the context in which they were offered; and (2) that any normative 
uses of deconstruction would themselves be subject to further decon-
structive critique. 
These conclusions are fully warranted. Deconstructive argument, 
like all other forms of rhetoric, is a communal practice existing in vari-
ous human institutions. It can be - and is - learned and taught, 
copied and parodied, understood and misunderstood. It can be - and 
is - the subject of countless Ph.D. theses and books. It is repeatable 
and transmissible, like all other features of human life existing in and 
articulated through human language and human social conventions. 
It is therefore subject to the vagaries of iterability and ideological drift. 
It is deconstructible.123 
Furthermore, because deconstructive argument is a practice of 
rhetoric, it is hardly surprising that it can be used for good or for ill. 
Like all rhetoric, deconstructive argument is a form of persuasive ad-
vocacy. As Aristotle pointed out, the advocate always takes large por-
tions of her audience's beliefs for granted and does not try to contest 
them.124 Instead, she focuses on specific questions and makes use of 
beliefs and attitudes that she and her audience hold in common.125 
Some of these beliefs may be only partially correct; others may even be 
the result of unthinking acceptance of community norms. Neverthe-
less, the advocate refrains from attacking them because they actually 
assist her in making her argliment. 
In this regard the human practice of deconstructive argument is 
much the same as other forms of persuasive rhetoric. It begins some-
where and ends somewhere. It takes certain features of culture and 
123. It might seem strange for me to note the obvious - that people learn to deconstruct in 
departments of comparative literature, that theses on deconstruction that repeatedly apply 
deconstructive arguments are produced in great numbers, that these theses are criticized or ap-
plauded as good and bad examples, that people can apply the varieties of deconstructive argu-
ments they find in certain texts to later problems, and that other members of the relevant 
interpretive community of deconstructive scholars agree that these later applications are also 
deconstructive. I emphasize these features - the repeatability and the communal nature of 
deconstructive practice - precisely because Jacques Derrida has always been so uncomfortable 
with such statements, leading as they do to the conclusion that there is, after all, a deconstructive 
method, that can be taught, practiced, and repeatedly applied in new situations. At the same 
time, Derrida has been quick to point out that certain arguments are misstatements of decon-
struction, that others are poorly performed versions of deconstruction, and that particular decon-
structive readings are themselves subject to further deconstruction. My theory of 
Deconstruction as a normative chasm shows how one might consistently hold these positions; 
nevertheless it commits Derrida - and other deconstructionists - to something like a transcen-
dental account of deconstruction. 
124. See ARISTOTLE, THE "ART" OF RHETORIC, Book I, § 1.12 (John H. Freese trans., Loeb 
Classical Library 1982). 
125. See id. 
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convention for granted and uses them to deconstruct others. Thus, 
people can use deconstructive argument for different purposes because 
they can begin their critiques with different texts or different features 
of the same text. Because the normative chasm between value and 
articulation applies to all aspects of human culture and convention, 
there will always be some discrepancy or instability to deconstruct in 
every conceptual structure and in every normative position. Thus, de-
pending upon where one starts and where one ends, one can put into 
question different distinctions and conceptual oppositions that support 
or justify different interpretations or different actions. 
If deconstructive argument is a form of rhetorical practice, then 
the ethical status of deconstruction is very much like the question of 
the relationship of rhetoric to ethics. The latter question has been the 
focus of a great historical debate. Quintilian, the great Roman theorist 
of rhetoric, claimed that good oratory is a good person speaking 
well. 126 This statement might be read to suggest that well-done ora-
tory must also serve a just objective and, conversely, that arguments 
motivated by an unjust purpose or a bad character will always mani-
fest poor rhetorical style. 127 Although this position has had its adher-
ents throughout history, 128 many people consider it wishful 
thinking. 129 A more common position on the ethics of rhetoric is that 
of Plato, who compared rhetoric to cosmetics, flattery, and the baking 
of pastries. 130 Plato argued that rhetoric misleads people by giving 
certain positions an artificial appeal, just as a pastry chef gives food an 
artificial appeal that is undeserved given its lack of nutritional 
value. 131 Thus, far from always serving just ends, rhetoric was a de-
vice inherently designed to falsify and obfuscate. 
Aristotle struck a middle position between these two extremes. He 
emphasized that rhetoric is a useful and important feature of public 
126. 4 QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIO 0RATOR1A, Book XII, § 1.1 (H.E. Butler trans., Loeb 
Classical Library 1961). 
127. See id., §§ 1.3-.13. 
128. A recent example is RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS 5-15 (1992), which argues that 
unjust judicial opinions usually display rhetorical flaws. 
129. Quintilian himself recognized that "common opinion is practically unanimous in [re-
jecting] this view." QUINTILIAN, supra note 126, § 1.14. His claim is all the more puzzling given 
that he was involved in the training of lawyers, who are taught to argue both sides of a case with 
equal ability. However, Quintilian's position was motivated by a much more plausible one: He 
believed that the proper use of rhetoric could only be guaranteed by a rigorous moral education 
that produced a good character; hence he felt that rhetorical and moral education must occur 
together. See id., §§ 2.1-.2. 
130. PLATO, Gorgias, in COLLECTED DIALOGUES, supra note 20, at 229 (W.D. Woodhead 
trans., 1953). 
131. Id. at 245-57. 
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life. 132 But its publicity means that it can be used for many different 
purposes. 133 It is surely wrong to employ rhetoric for evil ends; never-
theless, it is worthwhile to be able to argue both sides of a case pre-
cisely so that one can better respond to the unjust use of rhetoric when 
one encounters it. 134 Although one can use rhetoric for good or for ill, 
the same can be said of many useful things, like strength, health, 
wealth, and strategic expertise.135 Rhetoric's ability to be employed 
for both good and wicked purposes should lead us to recognize the 
responsibility that each of us has for the arguments that he or she 
makes. Each of us - Derrida and de Man included - may become 
skillful at persuasion. Yet with this skill comes responsibility. Like all 
other kinds of rhetoric, we must use the practice of deconstruction 
responsibly, because the practice itself will not guarantee the purity of 
our motives or the goodness of our actions. 
CONCLUSION 
The encounter between deconstruction and justice has changed 
both parties; yet, of the two, deconstruction appears to be the more 
transformed. If deconstructive practice is to be of any use to the ques-
tion of justice, it must become a transcendental deconstruction. It 
must exchange the logic of the infinite for that of the indefinite. It 
must act in the service of human values that go beyond culture, con-
vention, and law. It must recognize the chasm that differentiates 
human value from articulated conceptions of it, and it must identify 
Deconstruction with that chasm. Finally, one must understand 
deconstructive practice as .a rhetorical practice that employs Decon-
struction but is not identical to it. Because deconstructive practice is a 
practice, it is repeatable, teachable, and alterable like any other human 
convention. Because it is rhetorical, it can be used for good or for ill. 
There is one more transformation yet to come. Understanding the 
subject of justice must lead us to reunderstand the subject. Derrida 
speaks repeatedly of the "infinite demand" of justice. But his meta-
phor obscures a central point: Justice does not demand anything, for 
justice is not a person that could demand. Justice is a human value. It 
132. Cf ARISTOTLE, supra note 124, Book I, § 1.10 (offering arguments for the utility of 
rhetoric). 
133. As George Kennedy reminds us, "Aristotle was the first person to recognize clearly that 
rhetoric as an art of communication was morally neutral, that it could be used either for good or 
ill." George A. Kennedy, Introduction to ARISTOTLE ON RHETORIC ix (George A. Kennedy 
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1991). 
134. ARISTOTLE, supra note 124, Book I, § 1.12. 
135. See id., § 1.13. 
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is a value lodged in the hearts of human beings. It is people who de-
mand justice, and who demand it of one another. 
Derrida's placement of justice in the role of the grammatical sub-
ject - the subject who demands justice - obscures the fact that the 
real subject of justice is, and always has been, not a concept, not a 
grammatical subject, but a person. This subject of justice is someone 
who can experience justice and injustice, who can feel wronged or vin-
dicated, harmed or helped, who can understand that she or someone 
else has been treated justly or unjustly. 
There is something uncannily appropriate in Derrida's way of ex-
pressing himself, replacing the individual subject with a grand abstrac-
tion. Deconstruction first came to public attention in the wake of 
structuralism, an intellectual movement that effaced the human sub-
ject and sought to explain it as an effect or byproduct of language and 
culture. These attempts to dissolve the human subject were in tum 
part of a larger tendency in French thought toward antihumanism.136 
Derrida broke with structuralism in several respects, but not in this 
one. He adopted the largely antihumanist assumptions then reigning 
in French intellectual life, as well as the unfortunate tendency in Con-
tinental philosophy to make grammatical subjects out of philosophical 
predicates. 
In fact, there has always been the temptation in Derrida's work to 
do without the individual human subject, to speak of Deconstruction, 
but not of deconstructors; of signs, but not those who signify; of mean-
ings, but not those who mean; of justice, but not of people who value 
the just. Especially in his early works, one sometimes finds the sugges-
tion that there are simply signs pointing to each other, without the 
necessary support of any human intelligence.t37 
Nevertheless, this raises a serious difficulty. How can there be 
signs without subjects to understand them? After all, as Charles 
Sanders Pierce defined it, a sign is something that stands for something 
else to somebody in some relation or context. 138 Without the "some-
body" to make or understand the sign, signification becomes impossi-
ble, and Derrida's philosophical project falls apart. Thus, although 
antihumanism and semiotics are often identified with each other, in 
fact they are mutually incompatible. 
136. On French antihumanism, see KATE SOPER, HUMANISM AND ANTI-HUMANISM 
(1986). 
137. See, e.g., DERRIDA, supra note 75, at 25 ("[T]he meaning of meaning ... is infinite 
implication, the indefinite referral of signifier to signifier."). 
138. 2 COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PIERCE~ 228 (Charles Hartshorne & 
Paul Weiss eds., 1960). 
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One way out of this difficulty is to postulate a Transcendental Sub-
ject who does all of the work of meaning and understanding all signs. 
This is the Hegelian solution; it projects human intelligence onto a 
single great Mind. The second solution, which Derrida has occasion-
ally toyed with over' the years, is semiotic materialism.139 It argues 
that signs are material traces or are formed from the juxtapositions of 
material elements. Thus, a sign does not need to be understood by 
anyone in order to exist as a sign; its semiotic character is ensured by 
its relationship to other signs without the mediation of a conscious-
ness. Moreover, instead of explaining signs in terms of consciousness, 
as Pierce did, we explain consciousness in terms of signs. So the self 
becomes an "effect" or "determination" of a system of differentiated 
signs.140 Neither of these solutions is completely satisfactory. A third 
and better solution is simply to abandon antihumanism and to reem-
phasize the importance of individual subjects in the creation of a cul-
ture that in tum creates them. 
Deconstruction's confrontation with questions of justice presses 
this third alternative upon us; confronting the question of justice raises 
the problem of the subject with renewed urgency. Derrida wants to 
speak of responsibility and choice; he wants to say that de Man's crit-
ics are unfair and that de Man was a good and generous person. He 
wants to assert that each of us has an infinite responsibility to the 
Other. Yet, in order to speak in this way, he needs subjects who are 
response-able - who can make choices and can be praised or blamed, 
rewarded or held responsible for them. His arguments about· justice 
become incoherent unless he assumes the existence of individuals who 
are more than the products of cultural writing, and who can bear a 
responsibility to others, whether this responsibility is infinite or 
indefinite. 
Thus, the antihumanist vocabulary that has for so long been asso-
ciated with deconstruction must be abandoned when deconstruction 
confronts questions of justice in the real world. Once again, it is inter-
esting to look at the treatment of the subject in Derrida's essays about 
Paul de Man. In these essays, Derrida jettisons the antihumanist rhet-
oric of his earlier writings. He speaks of individual actions, individual 
139. Cf. RICHARD HARLAND, SUPERSTRUCTURALISM: THE PHILOSOPHY OF STRUCTURAL-
ISM AND POST-STRUCTURALISM 146-54 (1987); T.K. SEUNG, STRUCTURALISM AND HERME-
NEUTICS 256-57 (1982). 
140. See JACQUES DERRIDA, SPEECH AND PHENOMENA 147 (David B. Allison trans., 
Northwestern Univ. Press 1973) (1967-1968). Of course, the words "effect" and "determina-
tion" must be put in quotes because the very notions of "cause" and "effect" become inadequate 
in Derrida's approach. Id. 
1186 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:1131 
meanings, and individual responsibilities. 141 Indeed, when Derrida 
discusses the ethical responsibilities of de Man and his critics in these 
writings, one could easily be forgiven for mistaking his discourse with 
familiar liberal notions of autonomy and free will. 
The subject who emerges from deconstruction's encounter with 
justice may not be in all respects the relatively autonomous subject of 
traditional political theory; nevertheless, she is a person who can 
choose and hence bear the responsibility for her choices. 142 Decon-
struction's encounter with justice shows how urgently the concept of a 
socially constructed subject needs revision. The challenge is to inte-
grate deconstructive insights about language and meaning with the re-
ality of individual subjects and the claims of individual responsibility. 
The transcendental conception of deconstruction can prove helpful in 
this endeavor. It argues that human beings articulate their values 
through culture and conventions. But this articulation is by no means 
uniformly limiting. To the contrary, the articulation of human values 
through language and culture simultaneously empowers individuals. 
Although the cultural articulation of human values fails fully to cap-
ture these values, at the same time it opens up possibilities for action 
and hence for responsibility. It creates degrees of moral and practical 
freedom. 143 Thus, contrary to antihumanist assumptions, culture and 
language do not efface human autonomy but are the conditions of its 
very possibility. 
In one sense, it was inevitable that deconstructionists would have 
to rethink deconstruction's relationship to the subject the moment 
they became concerned with questions of justice. The notion of re-
sponsibility toward others presupposes people who can be responsible. 
The idea of an indefinite demand presupposes people to whom this 
demand can be addressed. The attempt to deconstruct systems of law 
or legal doctrines presupposes concern about the people unjustly af-
fected by them. Finally, the transcendental conception of deconstruc-
tion inevitably leads us back to the individual subject. For this 
conception locates justice not as a determinate, unchanging Idea in 
Heaven but as a value or urge within the human soul; hence the im-
portance of paying attention to the person possessing that soul. 
141. See, e.g., Derrida, Biodegradables, supra note 8, at 825-28. 
142. Drucilla Cornell reaches a similar conclusion in her study of the ethics of deconstruc-
tion. See CORNELL, supra note 75, at 149; cf. Binder, supra note 75, at 1383 ("There can be no 
right of self-determination if there is no self."). 
143. These arguments are further elaborated in J.M. Balkin, Cultural Software, 15 CARDOZO 
L. REV. (forthcoming 1994). 
